Christine B. May v. Morgan County Georgia
878 F.3d 1001
11th Cir.2017Background
- Christine May bought lakefront property, rented it short-term starting in 2008, but Morgan County’s zoning did not list short-term rentals as a permitted or conditional use.
- In 2010 the County adopted Regulation 15.35 (recodified later) banning single-family rentals for less than 30 days in May’s zoning district; May continued renting and received a criminal citation in August 2011.
- May sued the County in state court (2012), asserting a constitutional "grandfathered" right to continue short-term rentals; the trial court found the use grandfathered but the Georgia Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, and state courts ultimately dismissed her claims as untimely and for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; Georgia Supreme Court denied review.
- After the state litigation, May applied for rezoning and an ordinance amendment and requested a declaratory ruling; the County denied those applications in April 2015.
- May filed a federal suit (May 2015) seeking declaratory relief and a § 1983 claim asserting a vested constitutional grandfathered right; the district court dismissed the § 1983 claims under Rooker–Feldman and granted summary judgment on the declaratory claim based on issue preclusion, then declined supplemental jurisdiction over related administrative-denial claims.
- May appealed; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Rooker–Feldman bars federal review because her federal claims are inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgments rejecting her challenges as time-barred under Georgia law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker–Feldman bars May's § 1983 and declaratory claims attacking Regulation 15.35 and asserting a "grandfathered" constitutional right | May: Her § 1983 claim is not an as-applied challenge and thus not seeking review of state-court judgment; she claims a distinct vested constitutional right | County: May is a state-court loser asking federal court to revisit state-court rulings; claims are inextricably intertwined and time-barred under Georgia law | Court: Rooker–Feldman bars review because success would require rejecting the state-court judgment that her claims were untimely under § 5-3-20(a) |
| Whether May could avoid Rooker–Feldman by recasting claims after losing in state court | May: Recasting as a different federal claim avoids Rooker–Feldman | County: Substance controls; pretext not permitted—same injury and relief sought | Court: Substance governs; pretextual pleading cannot avoid Rooker–Feldman |
| Whether an exception to Rooker–Feldman exists when the state court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction | May: State court lacked jurisdiction, so federal courts should hear her § 1983 claim | County: State court had jurisdiction to apply the 30-day time bar; May already litigated and lost | Court: Eleventh Circuit has not adopted such an exception and, even if it had, the record shows the state court had jurisdiction to decide the time-bar issue; Rooker–Feldman still applies |
| Whether district court erred in declining to consider claims about the April 7, 2015 administrative denials | May: She briefly references challenge to administrative denials | County: Issue was not properly raised on appeal | Court: Appellate waiver—May failed to brief this issue adequately; it is abandoned |
Key Cases Cited
- D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (U.S. 1983) (establishes that federal courts cannot review state court decisions)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (U.S. 2005) (defines Rooker–Feldman narrow scope: applies to state-court losers asking federal courts to review state judgments)
- Casale v. Tillman, 558 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2009) (explains “inextricably intertwined” test and that pretextual pleadings do not avoid Rooker–Feldman)
- Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266 (11th Cir. 2009) (appellate standard of review for jurisdictional dismissals)
- Florida Wildlife Fed’n, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 859 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2017) (appellate courts may affirm on any record-supported ground)