315 P.3d 779
Haw. Ct. App.2013Background
- Christian pleaded no contest to OVUII on June 24, 2008, and was fined $700 plus fees; he did not appeal.
- Over two years after final judgment, Christian filed HRPP Rule 40 petition claiming the OVUII charge was deficient for lack of the public-road element, relying on Wheeler.
- The District Court denied the Rule 40 petition; Christian appealed challenging retroactivity and sufficiency of the charge.
- Wheeler held that OVUII charges must allege the public-road element, and that charging in the statute’s language without that element is deficient; pre-Wheeler decisions had treated the charge as sufficient in certain contexts.
- The Hawai'i Intermediate Court of Appeals held Wheeler should not be applied retroactively to collateral review, favoring a limited retroactivity approach and a heightened standard for relief on collateral review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Should Wheeler be retroactively applied on collateral review? | Christian argues Wheeler should apply to his Rule 40 petition. | State argues Wheeler should not be retroactive to collateral review. | Wheeler should not be given full retroactive effect on collateral review. |
| Was the pre-Wheeler OVUII charging language sufficient to charge a first offense? | Charge could be construed to charge OVUII as a first offense under Ruggiero/Kekuewa. | Wheeler changed the required charging language by including the public-road element. | Pre-Wheeler charging language could reasonably be construed as a first offense; not entitled to relief under Wheeler retroactivity. |
| If Wheeler applies, does Christian still meet the exceptional-circumstances standard for collateral relief? | Exceptional circumstances exist to warrant relief. | No exceptional circumstances shown; finality concerns predominate. | Christian failed to show exceptional circumstances; relief denied. |
| Does finality and liberal-construction doctrine trump collateral challenges to pre-Wheeler charges? | Liberal construction should allow relief when challenged post-conviction. | Finality interests and post-conviction standards limit such challenges. | Finality interests and the heightened collateral-review standard limit relief; no grounds shown. |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Wheeler, 121 Hawai'i 383, 219 P.3d 1170 (Haw. 2009) (OVUII charging rule requiring public-road element)
- State v. Ruggiero, 114 Hawai'i 227, 160 P.3d 703 (Haw. 2007) (indicates charging can be construed to charge first offense)
- State v. Kekuewa, 114 Hawai'i 411, 163 P.3d 1148 (Haw. 2007) (charging language may charge OVUII as first offense)
- State v. Walker, 126 Hawai'i 475, 273 P.3d 1161 (Haw. 2012) (post-Wheeler rule clarified; essential elements differ after Wheeler)
- State v. Jess, 117 Hawai'i 381, 184 P.3d 133 (Haw. 2008) (framework for retroactivity of new rules)
- State v. Motta, 66 Haw. 89, 657 P.2d 1019 (Haw. 1983) (liberal construction standard for challenges on direct appeal)
- State v. Wells, 78 Hawai'i 373, 894 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1995) (liberal construction standard for post-conviction challenges)
- United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1989) (test for collateral-review exceptional circumstances)
- Keto v. United States, 189 F.2d 247 (8th Cir. 1951) (collateral-review standards for indictment sufficiency)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989) (finality principle in retroactivity)
- United States v. Cuch, 79 F.3d 987 (10th Cir. 1996) (finality concerns in retroactive application of jurisdictional rulings)
- State v. Cummings, 101 Hawai'i 139, 63 P.3d 1109 (Haw. 2003) (jurisdictional defects in charges discussion noted)