Christian Morrill v. Denton, Texas City of
693 F. App'x 304
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- In August 2012 Christian Morrill alleges that after telling officers he had a knife he complied with orders to lie face down and was then kicked and tased without provocation. He claims he never resisted.
- State charged Morrill with unlawful possession of a weapon and resisting arrest; Morrill pleaded nolo contendere to the weapons charge in March 2014 and the resisting-arrest charge was dismissed.
- Morrill filed a § 1983 excessive-force suit in November 2014, more than two years after the August 2012 incident; the district court dismissed the claim as time-barred under Texas’ two-year limitations period.
- The central legal question is when a § 1983 excessive-force claim accrues for statute-of-limitations purposes where related criminal charges (resisting arrest) were pending and later dismissed.
- Morrill argued accrual was delayed until the resisting-arrest charge was dismissed based on (1) alleged fraudulent concealment, (2) analogy to malicious prosecution, and (3) lack of awareness that the injury was a constitutional violation until dismissal.
- The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding Morrill’s § 1983 claim accrued on the date the force was inflicted (August 2012) because he knew the facts giving rise to the claim then and the dismissal of the criminal charge did not affect accrual.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did Morrill’s § 1983 excessive-force claim accrue for limitations purposes? | Accrual was delayed until the resisting-arrest charge was dismissed (Mar 2014) so the suit filed Nov 2014 is timely. | Accrual occurred on date force was inflicted (Aug 2012); limitations ran two years from that date. | Accrual occurred in Aug 2012; claim untimely. |
| Did the pending resisting-arrest charge fraudulently conceal facts and toll the limitations period? | The criminal charge concealed the critical facts, and Morrill reasonably relied on that concealment. | Morrill knew the critical facts (he alleged compliance and immediate force) and did not reasonably rely on any concealment. | No fraudulent concealment; tolling not warranted. |
| Is an excessive-force claim analogous to malicious prosecution (accruing only after favorable termination)? | Yes; because resolving the resisting-arrest charge affects whether force was lawful, so accrual should await termination. | No; malicious-prosecution accrual rule is tied to an element of that tort (favorable termination); excessive-force claims are independent and accrue when injury and causation are known. | Not analogous; accrual does not depend on outcome of criminal proceeding. |
| Does a plaintiff need to know a constitutional violation exists (not just the facts) before accrual? | Morrill did not know the force was constitutionally excessive until the charge was dismissed. | Accrual requires only knowledge of the injury and its connection to defendants’ actions, not awareness of the legal viability. | Plaintiff need only know the facts; legal viability is not required for accrual. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (accrual when plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action)
- Manuel v. City of Joliet, 137 S. Ct. 911 (procedural guide to accrual analysis for § 1983 claims)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (force must be judged on whether plaintiff was resisting arrest)
- Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939 (malicious prosecution requires favorable termination)
- Price v. City of San Antonio, 431 F.3d 890 (excessive-force claim accrues on date force inflicted)
- Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512 (accrual when plaintiff is or should be aware of injury and its connection to defendant)