97 N.E.3d 297
Ind. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Dec. 14, 2015 Deputy Switzer activated his cruiser lights to stop Batchelor for a seatbelt violation; Batchelor continued driving about 1 minute 38 seconds before pulling into a gravel lot and stopping.
- After stopping, Batchelor was ordered out, got on the ground, then resisted handcuffing and struggled with officers, kicking Deputy Switzer and injuring multiple officers.
- The State charged Batchelor with Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement (fleeing in a vehicle), Level 5 felony battery on a law enforcement officer (for the kick/injury), and a Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement (for resisting backup officers); Batchelor was convicted on all counts by a jury.
- At trial the court gave a jury instruction defining “flee” that tracked language from Cowans and allowed conviction if (1) defendant intended to escape, or (2) a reasonable driver would not have felt unsafe stopping immediately, or (3) such a reasonable driver would have stopped sooner.
- Batchelor did not object to the instruction; on appeal he argued the instruction misstated the mens rea and was fundamentally erroneous.
- The court affirmed the battery and misdemeanor convictions, reversed the Level 6 resisting-by-fleeing conviction, and remanded (retrial on the fleeing charge permitted if the State elects).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the jury instruction on “flee” misstated the mens rea for resisting law enforcement | State argued instruction properly explained “flee,” including safety-based justifications, and was appropriate to the facts | Batchelor argued the instruction allowed conviction on negligence/what a reasonable driver would do rather than proof of knowing or intentional flight | Court held the instruction was fundamentally erroneous because parts 2–3 authorized conviction on a negligence standard and thus misstated required mens rea (reversed Level 6 conviction) |
| Whether giving the Cowans-style instruction without defendant request was improper | State requested instruction as clarifying element of crime | Batchelor noted Cowans contemplated defendant-requested instruction; he did not request it | Court observed Cowans required defendant request; giving it at State's behest was erroneous and reinforced reversal analysis |
| Whether the instruction created an unconstitutional mandatory presumption or improperly emphasized limited evidence | State argued instruction permissively guided jury to consider safety justification | Batchelor argued instruction functioned as a mandatory presumption and singled out lack of safety evidence, relieving burden of proof | Court found instruction risked creating a mandatory presumption and unduly emphasized certain evidence, compounding error (not necessary to base reversal solely on this) |
| Whether other instructions or trial facts cured the erroneous instruction | State relied on general instructions correctly defining "knowingly"/"intentionally" and other evidence | Batchelor argued the erroneous instruction and prosecutor argument made mens rea central and prejudicial | Court held general mens rea instructions and other trial elements did not cure detailed erroneous instruction; mens rea was central, so error was fundamental |
Key Cases Cited
- Cowans v. State, 53 N.E.3d 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (discussed proper Cowans-style instruction defining "flee" and noted defendant-request requirement)
- Woodward v. State, 770 N.E.2d 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (held sufficient evidence of fleeing where defendant passed well-lit areas before stopping)
- Hall v. State, 937 N.E.2d 911 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (instruction misstating mens rea as "knew or should have known" was fundamental error)
- Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438 (Ind. 1998) (discusses mandatory presumption instructions and Due Process limits)
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1985) (federal precedent on impermissible mandatory presumptions in criminal instructions)
- Higgins v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (instructional language can create an impermissible presumption even without explicit "must" language)
- Marks v. State, 864 N.E.2d 408 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (disapproved instructions that single out certain evidence and thereby confuse jurors)
- Hoskins v. State, 441 N.E.2d 419 (Ind. 1982) (flight as evidence of consciousness of guilt)