Choate v. Celite Corp.
215 Cal. App. 4th 1460
| Cal. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Celite Corporation mines diatomaceous earth in California; union represents Celite's employees.
- Under 2003-2007 and 2007-2010 collective bargaining agreements, Celite paid only the annual vacation allotment at termination, not accrued pro rata vacation time.
- Terminated employees were to receive whatever vacation allotment is due upon separation; pro rata accrual toward next year's allotment was not paid.
- Choate, Henry, and Stricklin were laid off March 1, 2007; Celite paid 2007 allotment but not pro rata 2008 accrual for Jan–Mar 2007.
- Plaintiffs alleged (1) pro rata vacation pay under §227.3, (2) 30 days waiting time penalties under §203, and (3) related damages; courts denied summary adjudication on vacation pay and unfair competition, but granted penalties on waiver grounds.
- Judgment reversed and remanded; Celite to receive summary adjudication on waiting time penalties; penalties not due due to lack of willful nonpayment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §227.3 waiver must be clear and unmistakable | Choate argues waiver can be implied. | Celite argues waiver may be implied from totality of circumstances. | Waiver must be clearly and unmistakably stated in the CBA. |
| Whether the agreements waived the right to pro rata vacation pay | Plaintiffs contend no clear waiver of pro rata pay. | Celite asserts language and practice show waiver. | Agreements did not waive pro rata rights in clear terms. |
| Whether Celite acted willfully in not paying pro rata vacation time | Willful failure to pay pro rata vacation time entitles penalties. | Good-faith belief that waiver existed negates willfulness. | Celite did not act willfully; remanded for Celite to obtain summary adjudication on penalties. |
| Whether LMRA preempts the claim | State claim not preempted; based on waiver interpretation. | Preemption argued where interpretation of agreement is needed. | Not preempted; waiver analysis does not require interpretation of the entire agreement. |
Key Cases Cited
- Vasquez v. Superior Court, 80 Cal.App.4th 430 (2000) (clear and unmistakable standard for waiver of rights)
- Saustez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co., 31 Cal.3d 774 (1982) (ambiguity in waiver and vacation rights)
- Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994) (distinguishes waiver standards; relevant to federal preemption context)
- Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 692 (1983) (require clear/unambiguous waivers for waiving statutory rights)
- 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (clear/unmistakable waiver standard in federal context)
- Kirby v. Immoos Fire Protection, Inc., 53 Cal.4th 1244 (2012) (ambiguous labor statute interpretations favored to protect employees)
- Firestone v. Southern California Gas Co., 219 F.3d 1063 (9th Cir. 2000) (waiver discussions in wage-order context; distinguish from statutory rights)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (federal preemption framework for CA state claims)
- Burnside v. Kiewit Pacific Corp., 491 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2007) (preemption; determining when interpretation of agreement is required)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (preemption and interpretation standards for labor agreements)
- Sauste?, (see above) (-) (referenced for waiver standards in context of §227.3)