Cho Ex Rel. Situated v. City of N.Y.
910 F.3d 639
2d Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiffs (Cho, Nagle Washrite LLC, Diaz, El-Shabazz) faced eviction actions under NYC’s Nuisance Abatement Law and entered settlement agreements with the City rather than litigate.
- Each settlement was later "so-ordered" (judicially approved) by New York State Supreme Court justices and the nuisance actions were dismissed.
- Plaintiffs allege they were coerced into settlements that required waivers of constitutional rights (e.g., consent to warrantless inspections, exclusion of family members) and that the waivers were not knowing or voluntary.
- Plaintiffs sued in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and nominal damages, challenging the City’s alleged coercive settlement practices.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under the Rooker‑Feldman doctrine.
- The Second Circuit vacated and remanded, holding plaintiffs’ injuries were "merely ratified" by state-court so‑orders rather than caused by those judgments, so Rooker‑Feldman did not bar the federal suit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rooker‑Feldman bars the federal suit | Rooker‑Feldman does not apply because plaintiffs’ injuries were caused by the City’s coercive conduct and settlements, not by state‑court judgments | The so‑ordered settlement judgments caused plaintiffs’ injuries and thus the federal suit is a de facto appeal barred by Rooker‑Feldman | Rooker‑Feldman did not apply: plaintiffs’ injuries were "merely ratified" by state judgments, not produced by them |
| Whether plaintiffs are seeking review/reversal of state judgments | Plaintiffs say they challenge City conduct and the agreements themselves, not judicial rulings | City contends plaintiffs effectively seek to undo state‑court approvals | Court finds plaintiffs challenge the underlying conduct and agreements, not state judgments per se |
| Whether injury occurred before state courts so‑ordered stipulations | Plaintiffs: harm occurred upon coercion and/or execution of the settlement (some stipulations effective on signing) | City: injuries arose only when stipulations were so‑ordered | Court accepts that harm can exist at signing and that, in any event, the complaint attacks pre‑judicial conduct |
| Whether allowing suit would convert federal courts into appellate courts of state judgments | City warns permitting suit undermines comity and appellate structure | Plaintiffs argue federal courts may adjudicate constitutional claims about coercive behavior independent of state judgment review | Court observes this suit does not present the Rooker‑Feldman evil of a de facto state‑court appeal and permits district court jurisdiction to proceed |
Key Cases Cited
- Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (establishes principle that federal district courts lack jurisdiction to review state-court judgments)
- District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (clarifies limits on federal review of state-court adjudications)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (narrows Rooker‑Feldman to cases by state‑court losers complaining of injuries caused by state judgments and seeking their review)
- Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.) (articulates four‑part test for Rooker‑Feldman application)
- Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Associates, LLC, 780 F.3d 70 (2d Cir.) (Rooker‑Feldman did not bar suit alleging fraudulent conduct that produced state judgments; judgments were mere ratification)
- Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, N.Y., 170 F.3d 311 (2d Cir.) (nominal damages available for proven constitutional violations)