Chiquita Lynette Parker v. Commonwealth of Virginia
0303161
| Va. Ct. App. | Oct 3, 2017Background
- Parker was stopped after running a red light on Sept. 20, 2014; a trooper learned her Virginia license was suspended via a law-enforcement database.
- At trial the Commonwealth offered a redacted DMV transcript obtained by the trooper; Parker objected and raised four challenges to its admission.
- Parker’s objections: (1) the DMV transcript was obtained in a manner inconsistent with Code § 46.2-384 and therefore inadmissible; (2) the transcript contained an inaccuracy (even though the erroneous entry was redacted); (3) admission violated her Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights; and (4) Code § 46.2-384’s “prima facie” language impermissibly shifted the burden of proof in violation of due process.
- The trial court overruled each objection, admitted the transcript, and a jury convicted Parker of driving on a suspended license (third or subsequent offense); sentence was 12 months and a $2,500 fine.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (a) § 46.2-384’s procedural directive does not control admissibility, (b) a single redacted error does not mandate exclusion, (c) DMV transcripts are nontestimonial under controlling panel precedent, and (d) the statute creates a permissive inference, not a mandatory presumption.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Parker) | Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether compliance with Code § 46.2-384 is a prerequisite to admissibility of a DMV transcript | § 46.2-384 requires DMV to furnish transcripts directly to the Commonwealth; deviation (DMV → trooper → prosecutor) makes transcript inadmissible | Admissibility governed by separate statute (§ 46.2-215) requiring authentication; § 46.2-384 is procedural and does not confer defendant rights | Reversed: strict compliance with § 46.2-384 not required for admissibility; no prejudice shown |
| Whether a transcript error (redacted) renders the transcript inadmissible | Any inaccuracy undermines reliability and mandates exclusion | A redacted single error does not warrant wholesale exclusion; transcript was authenticated and rebuttable | Trial court did not abuse discretion; redaction and opportunity to rebut suffice |
| Whether admitting the DMV transcript violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause | Transcript is testimonial; admission without live witness/cross-examination violates Crawford | DMV transcripts are business/public records and nontestimonial; prior panel precedent controls | Confrontation challenge fails: DMV transcripts are nontestimonial under binding circuit precedent (Jasper/Boone) |
| Whether § 46.2-384’s “shall be prima facie evidence” language unconstitutionally shifts burden of proof | The statutory language creates a presumption that relieves the Commonwealth of proving prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt | The statute creates a permissive inference/rebuttable presumption; Commonwealth retains ultimate burden | Due process not violated: statute creates permissive inference, not mandatory presumption |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 666 (discusses standard for viewing evidence in favor of Commonwealth) (cited for appellate evidence view)
- Midkiff v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 216 (trial court discretion on admissibility reviewed for abuse) (evidentiary standard)
- Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (business/public records generally nontestimonial) (Confrontation Clause framework)
- Jasper v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 749 (Va. Ct. App.) (held DMV transcripts are nontestimonial)
- Boone v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 383 (Va. Ct. App.) (reaffirmed DMV transcripts nontestimonial)
- Lindsey v. Commonwealth, 293 Va. 1 (explains permissive inference vs. mandatory presumption and due process analysis)