Chinuhuk v. State
413 P.3d 1215
Alaska Ct. App.2018Background
- Five defendants convicted of sexual felonies were sentenced under AS 12.55.125(o) (enacted 2006), which required mandatory post-release probation for set minimum periods (5, 10, or 15 years) and provided that those probation terms "could not be suspended or reduced."
- Each sentence included suspended jail time and a mandatory probation period; all five later violated probation.
- At revocation hearings the defendants asked the superior court to execute all remaining suspended jail time and then terminate probation immediately (invoking the usual right to reject probation).
- The superior court executed the suspended jail time but refused to terminate probation, concluding AS 12.55.125(o) removed defendants’ right to reject the statutorily required probation.
- The Legislature repealed AS 12.55.125(o) in 2016; defendants moved to dismiss their appeals as moot, arguing repeal restored the ordinary right to reject probation. The State invoked AS 01.10.100(a) to argue repeal was not retroactive and did not extinguish penalties already imposed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Appellants) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether repeal of AS 12.55.125(o) moots appeals or frees defendants from mandatory probation | Repeal is not retroactive under AS 01.10.100(a); penalties imposed under the former law remain enforceable | Repeal entitles them to exercise the ordinary right to reject probation and thus moot the appeals | Repeal does not extinguish the statutorily imposed probation; appeals are not moot and mandatory probation remains enforceable |
| Whether defendants have the right to reject the mandatory probation imposed by AS 12.55.125(o) | The statute created a substantive, non-contractual penalty (mandatory supervision) that removes the usual right to refuse probation for those sentenced under (o) | Defendants contend ordinary Alaska law gives a defendant the right to reject probation and insist on active prison time instead | The court rejects defendants’ argument: (o) created mandatory, non-suspendable probation distinct from ordinary contractual probation; defendants cannot reject it |
| Whether superior court exceeded its authority by imposing particular probation conditions or failed to give adequate notice | State argues the court may impose appropriate conditions within statutory bounds | Defendants argue some conditions exceed court authority or lacked fair notice | Court declines to rule on specific condition/notice claims and directs defendants to raise these issues in superior court |
| Whether prosecution under AS 11.56.759 for probation violations (when no suspended time remains) would violate ex post facto principles for pre-enactment offenders (Wasili) | State: issue not ripe because no prosecution is pending | Wasili: prosecuting him under AS 11.56.759 would be ex post facto because his offense predates the statute | Court finds claim not ripe and declines to decide now |
Key Cases Cited
- Warden of Lewisburg Penitentiary v. Marrero, 417 U.S. 653 (1974) (repeal of sentencing provision does not alter sentences imposed under the prior law when statute indicates nonretroactivity)
- State v. Auliye, 57 P.3d 711 (Alaska App. 2002) (recognizes legislature may create mandatory, non-contractual probation distinct from ordinary suspended-sentence probation)
- Brown v. State, 559 P.2d 107 (Alaska 1977) (defendant generally has the right to refuse probation)
- Franzen v. State, 573 P.2d 55 (Alaska 1978) (discusses relationship between probation and suspended imprisonment)
- Figueroa v. State, 689 P.2d 512 (Alaska App. 1984) (addresses legal completeness of suspended terms and probation relationship)