Chin v. Merriot
470 Mass. 527
| Mass. | 2015Background
- Chester Chin and Edith Merriot divorced by judgment nisi on August 17, 2011; their separation agreement (Article VI) was merged into the judgment and required Chin to pay $650/month alimony until death or Merriot’s remarriage.
- The Alimony Reform Act of 2011 (St. 2011, c. 124) took effect March 1, 2012, and created statutory provisions including a retirement termination rule and a cohabitation termination rule for "general term alimony."
- In March 2013 Chin filed to modify/terminate alimony, arguing (1) he reached "full retirement age" under the Act and (2) Merriot had cohabited with a person in a common household for over three months.
- The Probate and Family Court judge concluded the Act’s retirement and cohabitation provisions did not apply retroactively to judgments entered before March 1, 2012, applied the pre-Act material-change standard, found Chin had not shown a material change, and dismissed his complaint.
- The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review to decide whether the Act’s termination provisions govern modification of merged, pre-Act general-term alimony judgments.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Act’s retirement provision (§49(f)) terminates pre‑Act merged general‑term alimony when payor reaches statutory full retirement age | Chin: §49(f) terminates general‑term alimony upon payor reaching full retirement age, so his obligation ends | Merriot: Uncodified §4 makes §49 prospective; pre‑Act judgments terminate only as their terms allow or under pre‑Act modification standards | Held: Retirement provision applies prospectively; it does not permit terminating pre‑Act merged alimony absent applicable pre‑Act change‑of‑circumstances or specific statutory exception |
| Whether the Act’s cohabitation provision (§49(d)) permits termination of pre‑Act merged general‑term alimony when recipient cohabits | Chin: §49(d) authorizes suspension/reduction/termination after three months of cohabitation | Merriot: Uncodified §4(b) bars treating §48–55 as a material change for existing judgments except durational limits; cohabitation is not a durational limit | Held: Cohabitation provision is prospective and not a material‑change basis to terminate pre‑Act alimony; modification requires the pre‑Act material‑change showing |
| Proper interpretation of uncodified transition provisions (Sections 4–6) — do any §49 rules apply retroactively to existing alimony judgments? | Chin: The phrase "as otherwise provided for in this act" allows §49 termination rules to apply to pre‑Act judgments | Merriot: The uncodified text, read as a whole, shows the Legislature intended prospective application except limited retroactivity for durational limits | Held: Uncodified §§4–6 show Legislature intended prospective application of §49; only durational limits could be treated as material change for existing awards |
| Standard for modifying merged separation‑agreement alimony in pre‑Act judgment | Chin: statutory §49 rules should control | Merriot: Pre‑Act case law and G. L. c. 208, §37 material‑change standard governs merged judgments entered before the Act | Held: Pre‑Act material‑change standard governs; merged alimony may be modified only by that standard unless Act explicitly provides otherwise (durational limits exception) |
Key Cases Cited
- Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286 (Mass. 2009) (merged agreement informs modification; judge may consider parties’ negotiated terms)
- Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366 (Mass. 1981) (alimony modifiable upon material change in circumstances)
- Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653 (Mass. 2014) (Alimony Reform Act classifies existing alimony as "general term alimony")
- Murphy v. Department of Correction, 429 Mass. 736 (Mass. 1999) (uncodified provisions construed with codified statute for legislative intent)
- Heins v. Ledis, 422 Mass. 477 (Mass. 1996) (alimony subject to change‑of‑circumstances standard; property settlements are not)