CHIMENTI v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT CORRECTIONS (DOC)
2:15-cv-03333
E.D. Pa.Aug 8, 2017Background
- Plaintiffs are DOC inmates (lead: Chimenti, Leyva, Maldonado) with chronic Hepatitis C who allege DOC and certain medical providers denied or delayed curative direct-acting antiviral drugs (DAADs).
- Plaintiffs challenge a November 2016 DOC Hepatitis C Protocol that rationed DAADs by fibrosis stage, allegedly denying treatment to >98% of infected inmates for cost reasons despite DAADs being the community standard and highly effective.
- Chimenti alleges prolonged denial/delay from 2013–2016, worsening liver disease (stage 4 cirrhosis), unnecessary biopsy insistence, and eventual DAAD treatment only in October 2016.
- Plaintiffs seek classwide injunctive relief to require DOC to adopt community-standard Hepatitis C treatment and individual damages for constitutional violations; proposed class ≈5,400 inmates.
- Procedural posture: Motions to dismiss by DOC and Medical Defendants. Parties agreed to dismiss some defendants/claims; court considered remaining § 1983 Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claims and several malpractice and state-constitutional claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether DOC policy denying/ rationing DAADs states Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim | DOC’s protocol denies medically necessary, community-standard DAADs to most inmates solely for cost, creating excessive risk of serious harm | Cost-based rationing or disagreement with treatment decisions does not, as a matter of law, establish deliberate indifference | Denied dismissal: allegations that DOC rationed DAADs based solely on cost and that DAADs are the only recommended treatment sufficiently plead deliberate indifference |
| Whether individual DOC officials (Wetzel, Noel, others) are plausibly liable under § 1983 | Committee members formulated/implemented protocol and knowingly denied treatment, causing harm | Officials lacked personal culpability or were following evolving protocols; qualified immunity protects them | Denied dismissal as to key DOC officials: facts allege personal involvement and deliberate indifference; qualified immunity not resolved at pleading stage |
| Whether private medical contractors (Correct Care, Wexford) and certain medical directors (Cowan) are liable under § 1983 | Contractors participated in care and committee; contributed to policy and implementation | Monell/Natale bars respondeat-superior; must plead corporate policy/custom causing violation; no such allegations here | Granted dismissal for Correct Care, Wexford, and Dr. Cowan: complaint fails to allege their own policy or causation sufficient for § 1983 liability |
| Whether treating prison medical disagreements (choice of drug/timing) amount to constitutional violation | Denial of DAADs (the only recommended cure) and requirement of unnecessary biopsy show more than mere disagreement | Many cases show mere disagreement or provision of alternative care is not deliberate indifference | Court found allegations here go beyond disagreement because protocol allegedly foreclosed standard-of-care DAAD treatment and caused worsening conditions; claim survives pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference standard for denial of medical care)
- Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference requires knowledge of and disregard for substantial risk to inmate health)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability under § 1983 requires an official policy or custom)
- Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (legal conclusions not accepted as true on a motion to dismiss)
- Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223 (3d Cir. 2010) (documents integral to complaint may be considered on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion)
- Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843 (7th Cir. 2011) (administrative cost may be considered but not to the exclusion of reasonable medical judgment)
