Chicago Teachers Union, Local v. Board of Education of the City
797 F.3d 426
7th Cir.2015Background
- In 2012 CPS evaluated schools for statutory "turnaround" (reconstitution) eligibility: CEO first identified 226 probationary schools, then removed schools meeting objective performance thresholds, leaving 74 for further review; 10 schools were ultimately recommended and the Board authorized reconstitution.
- The third-stage selection involved a small central committee (CEO Brizard, Chief Portfolio Officer, Network Chiefs, Chief Academic Officer, and staff) applying a set of qualitative factors (academic performance and trends, leadership, utilization, proximity/effects on other schools, school culture, facilities, safety, parent/community input, CPS staff input).
- Reconstitution led to termination/displacement of teachers/staff at the ten schools; African-American teachers comprised 51% of displaced tenured teachers while representing ~27% of CPS teachers overall (213 African-American employees displaced).
- Plaintiffs (three African-American tenured teachers and the Chicago Teachers Union) sought class certification alleging racial discrimination under Title VII and §§ 1981, 1983; proposed classes sought (a) declaratory/injunctive relief under Rule 23(b)(2) and (b) monetary/individual relief under Rule 23(b)(3).
- The district court denied class certification, finding commonality and predominance lacking because the selection process was qualitative and required individualized inquiry into each school's selection.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding plaintiffs met Rule 23(a) commonality and the requirements of Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) for class certification (remanding for further proceedings consistent with the opinion).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 23(a) commonality exists | The objective early steps (eligibility and culling by objective metrics) and a uniform set of criteria applied by a single decision-making body create a common question whether the process had disparate impact/treatment on African-American staff | The selection involved subjective, case-by-case discretion by multiple actors so there is no common question that will produce a classwide answer (Wal‑Mart) | Commonality satisfied: uniform objective steps plus a centralized committee and single CEO recommendation supply the "glue" to bind claims together |
| Whether Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive/declaratory class is appropriate | Seeks classwide declaratory and prospective injunctive relief (moratorium, monitor) applicable to all; any monetary relief would be incidental and mechanical | Individualized remedies (reinstatement, back/front pay) show (b)(2) is inappropriate | 23(b)(2) certification appropriate for declaratory/injunctive relief; individualized remedies do not defeat (b)(2) where classwide liability/injunction is sought |
| Whether Rule 23(b)(3) predominance is met for monetary claims | Liability question (whether selection process unlawfully discriminated) predominates and can be resolved classwide; damages can be addressed later individually or by subclasses | Qualitative, individualized selection rationale for each school means individual issues predominate | 23(b)(3) predominance satisfied: common liability question predominates even if damages require individualized determinations |
| Applicability of Wal‑Mart (Dukes) and related precedent | Wal‑Mart does not bar classes where a central policy/process or an objective discriminatory step binds class members; cases like Teal, McReynolds support certification where company-wide practices create disparate impact | Wal‑Mart bars certification when decisions result from many discretionary local actors without a uniform corporate policy | Wal‑Mart distinguished: here central committee and objective earlier steps function as a common practice; McReynolds and Teal show subjective discretion or an objective intermediate step can still support classwide adjudication |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (Sup. Ct.) (class-certification commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution)
- McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir. 2012) (company-wide policies can supply commonality despite local discretion)
- Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893 (7th Cir. 2012) (reversing certification where project-level discretion and differing local conditions defeated commonality)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (Sup. Ct.) (Rule 23(b)(3) predominance focuses on whether common questions predominate, not on merits resolution)
- Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364 (7th Cir. 2012) (monetary relief may be incidental to (b)(2) if computation is mechanical/formulaic)
- Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014) (class certification requires that the same conduct gives rise to the same kind of claims for class members)
- Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (Sup. Ct.) (an objectively discriminatory intermediate step can taint an entire process and support liability)
- CE Design Ltd. v. King Architectural Metals, Inc., 637 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 2011) (standard of review for class-certification rulings is abuse of discretion)