Chiafalo v. Washington
591 U.S. 578
SCOTUS2020Background
- Presidential electors are chosen by state mechanisms (usually party slates) and historically expected to vote the party/popular ticket. 32 States + D.C. have pledge laws; 15 States back those pledges with sanctions (fines or removal).
- Washington required electors to execute a pledge to support their party’s presidential/vice‑presidential nominees and (at the time) imposed a civil fine up to $1,000 for violating it.
- In 2016, three Washington Democratic electors (Chiafalo, Guerra, John) pledged for Hillary Clinton but cast votes for Colin Powell and were fined $1,000 each by Washington.
- The electors sued, claiming the Constitution protects elector discretion; the Washington Supreme Court upheld the fine (relying on Ray v. Blair), while the Tenth Circuit reached the opposite outcome in Baca v. Colorado, creating a split.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Washington Supreme Court: States may enforce elector pledges (including by sanction).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a State may enforce an elector’s pledge by legal sanction (fine/removal) | Electors argued the Constitution grants electors independent discretion to vote as they choose | States argued Article II appointment power and history allow conditioning appointment and enforcing pledges | Held: States may enforce elector pledges with sanctions (affirming Washington) |
| Whether Article II and the Twelfth Amendment guarantee elector voting independence | Petitioners: terms like “electors,” “vote,” and “ballot” imply freedom of choice | Respondent: those terms do not inherently guarantee discretion; appointment power permits conditions | Held: Text does not prohibit States from binding electors; wording does not establish a right to discretion |
| Whether historical practice supports binding electors or independent electors | Petitioners: historical instances of faithless electors show longstanding independence | Respondent: historical practice overwhelmingly shows electors were expected to follow party/popular choice; faithless votes are rare/anomalous | Held: Historical practice strongly supports non‑discretionary, party‑bound electors and supports state enforcement |
| Source of States’ authority to bind electors (Article II appointment power vs. Tenth Amendment/residual state power) | Petitioners: N/A (primarily challenged enforceability) | Dissent/concurring view (Thomas): Constitution is silent; authority resides in States/people under the Tenth Amendment rather than Article II | Held: Majority grounds decision in Article II appointment power and historical practice; Justice Thomas concurs in judgment but would ground decision in states’ reserved powers under the Tenth Amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214 (1952) (upheld pledge requirement but reserved whether States may enforce pledges with penalties)
- McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) (Article II appointments clause grants broad state power over elector selection)
- The Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929) (long‑settled practice may inform constitutional interpretation)
- NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014) (historical practice can weigh heavily in constitutional interpretation)
- U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (discusses limits of federal grants and relevance of state powers; cited in concurrence)
- McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (structural federalism principles regarding enumerated federal powers, relied on in concurrence)