Cheyenne Desertrain v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.3d 1147

Los Angeles Municipal Code § 85.02 (1983) forbids using a vehicle “as living quarters either overnight, day-by-day, or otherwise.”
In 2010 the LAPD created a Venice Homelessness Task Force to enforce § 85.02; officers received informal guidance and internal memos that were inconsistent about what conduct triggered enforcement.
Plaintiffs are homeless individuals who used or stored belongings in vehicles and were warned, cited, arrested, or had vehicles impounded under § 85.02 despite sometimes not sleeping in their vehicles.
Plaintiffs raised a vagueness challenge at summary judgment after late discovery revealed the LAPD memoranda; the district court declined to consider the vagueness claim because it was not in the amended complaint and granted defendants summary judgment on all claims.
The Ninth Circuit held the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow amendment to address vagueness and reached the merits, finding § 85.02 facially unconstitutional as impermissibly vague and susceptible to discriminatory enforcement against the homeless.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 85.02 is unconstitutionally vague on its face	§ 85.02 gives no objective notice what "living quarters" or "otherwise" means; ordinary people cannot conform conduct	The statute is sufficiently clear; enforcement agency guidance (internal memos) limits scope	Held: § 85.02 is void for vagueness — fails notice and invites arbitrary enforcement
Whether agency limiting constructions cure vagueness	LAPD instructions were inconsistent or not followed, so they do not cure vagueness	City points to a 2008 memo setting multi-night/three-day occupancy thresholds	Held: The 2008 memo was disavowed and not followed; limiting construction did not save the ordinance
Whether district court erred by refusing to consider vagueness at summary judgment	Plaintiffs gave notice during discovery/depositions and in summary judgment filings; leave to amend should have been granted	Defendants argued vagueness wasn’t pleaded so they lacked notice	Held: District court abused discretion; amendment should have been allowed and issue reached on merits
Whether enforcement of § 85.02 resulted in discriminatory/arbitrary policing	Ordinance’s vagueness enabled selective enforcement targeted at homeless persons	City emphasized legitimate public-health/safety aims and selective incidents of disorder	Held: Ordinance permits discriminatory enforcement and was applied in a manner targeting the homeless

Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382 U.S. 399 (1966) (due-process fair-notice principle for penal statutes)
Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971) (vagueness invalidates statutes that force citizens to guess at prohibited conduct)
City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999) (loitering ordinance void for vagueness; lack of clear standard and risk of arbitrary enforcement)
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy statutes historically enabled discriminatory enforcement against the poor)
Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (vagueness doctrine and need for definite standards to prevent arbitrary policing)
Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) (penal statutes may not compel speculation as to their meaning)