Chester Loyde Bird v. State
2015 WY 108
| Wyo. | 2015Background
- In 1994 Chester Loyde Bird pled guilty to first-degree sexual assault and kidnapping while on parole; he was designated a habitual offender and sentenced to two concurrent life terms. The sentencing court did not state whether those life terms ran concurrently or consecutively to the sentence reimposed upon parole revocation.
- Bird raised multiple challenges over the years: direct appeal (Bird I), two motions to withdraw guilty pleas (one denied and affirmed in Bird II), a 2000 Rule 35 motion challenging habitual-offender enhancements (dismissed in Bird III), and other postconviction filings. Many claims were previously litigated.
- In October 2014 Bird filed a Rule 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence asserting (1) ambiguity whether sentences run concurrent or consecutive to parole revocation; (2) insufficient presentence jail credit; (3) unconstitutional $50 victim compensation surcharge tied to habitual-offender status; (4) failure to find ability to pay surcharge; and (5) denial of opportunity to allocute before the court clarified the sentence.
- The district court granted relief only as to presentence confinement credit (awarded 37 days) and denied the other claims. Bird appealed pro se.
- The Supreme Court reviewed the Rule 35(a) claims de novo as questions of law and applied res judicata where appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Bird’s Argument | State’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether sentence is illegal because court did not state concurrent vs consecutive to parole revocation | Trial court’s silence impermissibly delegated the concurrency decision and created illegality | Silence gives rise to presumption of consecutive sentences; no delegation shown | Barred by res judicata; presumption of consecutiveness applies and no illegal delegation here |
| 2. Whether presentence confinement credit was insufficient | Entitled to more credit against life sentences | Weldon: life-sentenced defendants not entitled to credit; district awarded 37 days anyway | Court awarded 37 days; claim barred by res judicata and credit does not affect life sentence per Weldon |
| 3. Constitutionality of $50 victim compensation surcharge tied to habitual-offender status | Surcharge violates double jeopardy and ex post facto prohibitions | Surcharge is statutorily authorized and constitutional; previously rejected | Barred by res judicata; constitutional challenge previously rejected in Bird II |
| 4. Failure to determine ability to pay before ordering surcharge | Court must make ability-to-pay finding before imposing surcharge | Bird paid the assessed amount; issue moot; claim could have been raised earlier | Moot (Bird paid) and barred by res judicata |
| 5. Whether court abused discretion by clarifying sentence without letting Bird allocute | Clarification was a new sentence and required defendant allocution under W.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(1)(C) | The order merely clarified the existing presumption of consecutiveness; not a new sentencing requiring allocution | No error: clarification did not constitute a new sentence, so allocution rule did not apply |
Key Cases Cited
- Bird v. State, 901 P.2d 1123 (Wyo. 1995) (direct appeal affirming convictions despite misinformation)
- Bird v. State, 939 P.2d 735 (Wyo. 1997) (rejecting collateral attack and upholding surcharge legality)
- Jones v. State, 79 P.3d 1021 (Wyo. 2003) (court improperly delegated concurrency decision to parole board)
- Weldon v. State, 800 P.2d 513 (Wyo. 1990) (defendant serving life sentence not entitled to presentence confinement credit)
- Presbury v. State, 226 P.3d 886 (Wyo. 2010) (denial of right to make a statement at sentencing is reversible error)
- Dax v. State, 272 P.3d 319 (Wyo. 2012) (res judicata bars relitigation of issues that were or could have been raised earlier)