Chesson v. Montgomery Mutual Insurance
75 A.3d 932
Md.2013Background
- This dispute centers on whether a mold-exposure causation theory may be admitted under Frye-Reed’s general-acceptance standard.
- The court explains Frye-Reed requires evidence to be generally accepted within the relevant scientific community before expert testimony is admissible.
- Six Church employees alleged neurocognitive and musculoskeletal symptoms from mold exposure; Dr. Shoemaker proposed a Repetitive Exposure Protocol and differential-diagnosis approach.
- Montgomery Mutual sought to exclude Dr. Shoemaker under Frye-Reed; the circuit court admitted him, the Court of Special Appeals reversed, and certiorari was granted.
- The Maryland Court ultimately holds that Shoemaker’s differential-diagnosis methodology is not generally accepted and not reliable, thus not admissible, relying on case law and the broader scientific literature.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Shoemaker’s differential-diagnosis method is generally accepted | Shoemaker’s method is generally accepted in medical practice | There is substantial scientific dispute and lack of consensus | No; not generally accepted |
| Whether Frye-Reed gatekeeping properly limits admissibility | Frye-Reed ensures reliable, demonstrated science | Frye-Reed is a gatekeeping tool to prevent unreliable theories | Unfavorable to plaintiff; gatekeeping applies |
| Whether the evidence supports reliability of the exposure-disease link | Temporal relationships and cohort data show causation | Literature shows insufficient evidence of mold causing these non-respiratory symptoms | Unproven; not generally accepted |
| Whether courts in other jurisdictions support Dr. Shoemaker’s approach | Other jurisdictions acknowledge or adopt Shoemaker’s methods | Other jurisdictions largely reject or question validity | Not generally accepted; persuasive authority lacking |
Key Cases Cited
- Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (Md. 1978) (Frye standard described; general acceptance required for novel techniques)
- Blackwell v. Wyeth, 408 Md. 575 (Md. 2009) (Frye-Reed gatekeeping; reliability and admissibility of expert testimony)
- Clemons v. State, 392 Md. 339 (Md. 2006) (Even generally accepted methods can lose admissibility if fundamental assumptions are not generally accepted)
- U.S. Gypsum v. Baltimore, 336 Md. 145 (Md. 1994) (General acceptance not equated with universal acceptance; evaluate divergence in scientific opinion)