Cheryl Searcy v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company
902 F.3d 1342
| 11th Cir. | 2018Background
- Cheryl Searcy (plaintiff) sued R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris (defendants) as an Engle-class member, alleging negligence, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy based on her mother Carol Lasard’s long-term cigarette addiction and death from lung disease.
- The original Engle class trial produced class-wide findings that (among other things) nicotine is addictive, smoking causes disease, the tobacco companies placed defective cigarettes on the market, and the companies concealed material information about smoking and addiction. Florida courts held those findings have preclusive effect in later "progeny" suits for certain conduct elements.
- At trial the district court instructed the jury to treat the Engle findings as established if the jury first found Lasard was an Engle-class member (i.e., addicted and addiction was a legal cause of her death). The progeny jury then decided individual causation, reliance for concealment claims, and damages.
- The jury found defendants liable on negligence, strict liability, fraudulent concealment, and conspiracy, awarded compensatory and punitive damages, and apportioned fault 40% to Lasard and 30% to each defendant; the district court reduced the award by remittitur but did not reduce compensatory damages for Lasard’s comparative fault.
- Defendants appealed, arguing (1) due process was violated by giving Engle concealment findings preclusive effect, (2) the Seventh Amendment was violated because the punitive-damages decision required reexamining the Engle jury’s findings, and (3) Florida’s comparative-fault statute required reducing damages for Lasard’s fault (or plaintiff waived the right to avoid apportionment).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Due process: may Engle’s class-wide concealment findings be given preclusive effect in an individual concealment claim? | Searcy relied on Florida courts’ rule giving Engle findings preclusive effect; Engle findings may be applied and Full Faith and Credit bars relitigation. | Defendants argued they were denied due process because the Engle concealment finding was too general (multiple concealment theories) and did not show the Engle jury "actually decided" the specific concealment on which Lasard relied. | Court affirmed: precedent (Walker, Graham, Burkhart) permits giving preclusive effect to Engle concealment findings; no due process violation. |
| Seventh Amendment (Reexamination Clause): did allowing the progeny jury to consider punitive damages impermissibly reexamine facts tried in Engle? | Searcy: punitive awards are reviewed by courts and do not constitute a forbidden reexamination of jury facts; her trial presented sufficient evidence about defendants’ specific conduct (e.g., low‑tar marketing) so the jury did not have to speculate about Engle’s basis. | Defendants: awarding punitive damages required the jury to speculate about which of the many concealment theories Engle relied on, thereby reexamining earlier jury findings. | Court held no violation: the jury was instructed not to speculate about Engle and to base punitive damages on conduct shown at the progeny trial; sufficient specific evidence was presented, so reexamination did not occur. |
| Comparative fault statutory application: does Fla. Stat. § 768.81 require reducing damages when jury awards cover both negligence and intentional torts? | Searcy: Florida Supreme Court law (Schoeff) and Engle jurisprudence prevent reduction of compensatory damages when an intentional-tort verdict exists; district court properly left reduction to judge but concluded reduction not authorized. | Defendants: § 768.81 mandates apportionment because the case is in part negligence, so damages must be reduced by plaintiff’s percentage of fault. | Court affirmed: under Florida precedent (Schoeff) compensatory damages cannot be reduced when the jury found for an intentional tort claim; court did not err. |
| Waiver of intentional-tort exception to comparative fault: did plaintiff waive the right to avoid apportionment by her pleadings or trial conduct? | Searcy: she repeatedly preserved her position that comparative fault does not apply to intentional-tort claims and sought a jury instruction to that effect; she did not intentionally relinquish the right. | Defendants: plaintiff’s complaint and some trial statements put comparative fault at issue and thus waived the intentional-tort exception. | Court held no waiver: record shows plaintiff sought to preserve the exception; ambiguous jury instruction resulted from defendants’ successful objections; district court did not abuse discretion in finding no waiver. |
Key Cases Cited
- Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So.2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (original class verdict and Florida Supreme Court framework giving certain Phase I findings preclusive effect in Engle progeny suits)
- Graham v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 857 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (held applying Engle findings for negligence and strict liability does not violate due process; framework considered for progeny preclusion)
- Burkhart v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 884 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 2018) (held preclusive effect of Engle concealment findings does not violate due process)
- Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2013) (earlier panel decision on Engle preclusion principles)
- Schoeff v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 232 So.3d 294 (Fla. 2017) (Florida Supreme Court: when an Engle progeny jury finds an intentional tort, compensatory damages may not be reduced under Florida’s comparative‑fault statute)
- Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931) (Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause: second juries cannot be forced to speculate about prior juries’ factual bases when issues are inseparable)