Cherry v. Siemens AG, 5:13-cv-05057

Plaintiff Farrell Cherry, an African-American, was terminated by Siemens Healthcare Diagnostics, Inc. as part of a company-wide reduction in force in November 2011.
Siemens asserted the RIF was for legitimate business reasons and based on performance, with Cherry being one of the lowest performers in his region.
Cherry had a long history of administrative and paperwork issues, negative peer feedback, and multiple performance warnings prior to the RIF, including a 2010 warning for administrative deficiencies.
Cherry’s supervisor, Blaine Raymer, repeatedly criticized Cherry’s administrative duties, time reporting, and documentation, while praising other aspects of his work and customer service.
Cherry contends the RIF was discriminatory and racially motivated, highlighting Cherry’s single African-American status in the Central Region and comparing his treatment to white coworkers.
The court analyzed Cherry’s claims under McDonnell Douglas and concluded Siemens offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the termination and Cherry failed to show pretext or discriminatory intent.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Cherry can establish a prima facie case of race discrimination	Cherry argues he is in a protected class, qualified, suffered termination, and was treated differently.	Siemens contends the RIF was neutral, business-necessity driven, and not motivated by race.	Yes, for purposes of summary judgment; presumption of discrimination arose, but later rebutted by Siemens.
Whether Siemens proffered a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Cherry's termination	Cherry asserts reasons are pretextual and selective, masking racial bias.	Siemens showed the RIF based on performance and business needs, with objective regional data.	Siemens provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason.
Whether Cherry shows pretext or discriminatory intent to defeat summary judgment	Cherry claims Raymer and Eide acted with racial animus, in concert with decisionmakers Siebert and Camela.	There is no direct evidence of discrimination; statements by lower-level employees do not prove pretext; no evidence of discriminatory intent by Siebert/Camela.	No genuine issue of material fact showing pretext or discriminatory intent; judgment for Siemens.

Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2006) (title VII burden on discrimination framework; pretext inquiry)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Rose-Maston v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 133 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 1998) (low threshold for prima facie case; shifting burden to employer)
Colenburg v. Colenburg, 619 F.3d 986 (8th Cir. 2010) (employer’s nondiscriminatory reason need not be correct; honesty of grounds matters)
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (pretext could be shown by weak basis in fact or more likely discriminatory motive)
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (U.S. 1989) (mixed-motives analysis for discrimination cases)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S. 1986) (standard for genuine disputes of material fact in summary judgment)
Aikens v. USPS Bd. of Govs., 460 U.S. 711 (U.S. 1983) (factual inquiry in Title VII cases is whether discrimination occurred)
Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1070 (8th Cir. 1996) (direct evidence and pretext analysis guidance)