Cherry v. New York City Department of Correction
698 F. App'x 27
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Bernard Cherry, pro se, was fired in 2007 after an OATH administrative law judge found excessive absenteeism and failure to comply with orders; the Appellate Division affirmed.
- In 2008, Cherry sued the City, DOC, and officials for employment discrimination; the district court dismissed as time-barred and this Court affirmed.
- In 2016 Cherry filed a new suit alleging defendants committed fraud on the court by submitting forged documents during the OATH proceeding, citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1) and (3).
- The district court construed the filing as a request to vacate the prior federal judgment and sua sponte dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
- On appeal Cherry clarified he sought to vacate the OATH administrative decision (not the federal judgment). The Second Circuit treated the pleading as seeking relief from the administrative judgment and affirmed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether federal courts have subject-matter jurisdiction to vacate an OATH administrative judgment based on alleged fraud on the court | Cherry argued fraud on the court (forged documents) warrants vacatur under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d) and related relief | Defendants (and district court) implicitly: no independent federal basis for jurisdiction; Rule 60 does not create jurisdiction; claim time-barred under § 1983 | No jurisdiction. Rule 60 does not create subject-matter jurisdiction; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether Federal Rules (Rule 60(d)) provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction | Cherry relied on Rule 60(d)(1) and (3) to authorize relief | Rule 60 cannot supply independent subject-matter jurisdiction | Held: Rule 60 is not an independent jurisdictional basis; citation to Cresswell affirmed that principle |
| Whether Cherry's claims could be construed as a timely § 1983 action | Cherry alleged deprivation tied to employment/OATH process | Defendants: applicable statute of limitations bars any § 1983 claim | Held: § 1983 claim would be time-barred under the relevant three-year limitations period |
| Whether ancillary jurisdiction permitted relief from an administrative tribunal decision in a different court | Cherry sought relief from the administrative judgment | Defendants: no independent federal basis; ancillary jurisdiction does not apply where the action seeks relief from a different tribunal's judgment | Held: Ancillary jurisdiction refused; independent jurisdiction required and absent |
Key Cases Cited
- Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.) (plaintiff bears burden to establish subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Kirkland v. Cablevision Systems, 760 F.3d 223 (2d Cir.) (pro se complaints construed liberally to raise strongest arguments suggested)
- Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787 (2d Cir.) (same rule on liberal pro se construction)
- Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60 (2d Cir.) (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create independent subject-matter jurisdiction)
- Patterson v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 375 F.3d 206 (2d Cir.) (applying three-year statute of limitations to § 1983 claims)
- United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38 (U.S.) (ancillary/independent action doctrine; relief from judgment in a different tribunal requires independent jurisdiction)