632 S.W.3d 284
Ark.2021Background
- Voters approved Arkansas Constitutional Amendment 100 (Nov. 2018), which required the Arkansas Racing Commission (ARC) to adopt rules and to require casino applicants in Pope County to submit a letter of support from the county judge (or quorum‑court resolution) and, if applicable, a mayoral letter.
- ARC promulgated Rule 2.13(5)(b) (Feb. 2019) and the General Assembly enacted Act 371/§ 23‑117‑101 (Mar. 2019), each adding that required letters "shall be dated and signed by the county judge... holding office at the time of the submission of an application."
- Gulfside obtained letters from outgoing Pope County officials dated December 2018; the ARC opened the application window May 1–30, 2019, when those officials were no longer in office. ARC denied all applications; Gulfside sued, challenging the Rule and statute as imposing additional qualifications not in Amendment 100.
- Cherokee Nation Businesses (CNB) sought to intervene; this Court earlier held CNB was entitled to intervene and remanded. On remand the circuit court granted Gulfside declaratory relief, declaring the Rule and § 23‑117‑101 unconstitutional for adding a temporal requirement; ARC and CNB appealed.
- The Arkansas Supreme Court reversed: it held the Rule and statute are consistent with Amendment 100 because the Amendment’s use of "the county judge" and of "applicant" (present‑tense) means the letter must come from the judge in office when the application is submitted; court dismissed the circuit‑court judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ARC Rule 2.13(5)(b) and Act 371 (§ 23‑117‑101) unlawfully add a temporal qualification by requiring letters be signed by the county judge holding office at the time of application submission | Gulfside: The Amendment prescribes only that an applicant have a letter from the county judge; adding "holding office at time of submission" is an additional qualification not in the Amendment | ARC/CNB: The Amendment’s use of "the county judge" and the present‑tense concept of an "applicant" means the letter must come from the judge holding office when the application is submitted; the Rule and statute merely implement the Amendment | The court held the Rule and statute are consistent with Amendment 100; the temporal requirement does not add a new qualification and is constitutional. |
Key Cases Cited
- Davis v. PennyMac Loan Servs., LLC, 599 S.W.3d 128 (Ark. 2020) (definite article "the" indicates a specific, identifiable officeholder in statutory construction)
- Stout v. Stinnett, 197 S.W.2d 564 (Ark. 1946) (definite article denotes a single, particular officeholder)
- Proctor v. Daniels, 392 S.W.3d 360 (Ark. 2010) (statute that adds qualifications to constitutional officeholding is unconstitutional)
- Reinert v. State, 71 S.W.3d 52 (Ark. 2002) (presumption of constitutionality for statutes)
- City of Fayetteville v. Washington County, 255 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2007) (constitutional provisions interpreted de novo; plain language controls)
- U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill, 872 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1994) (constitutional amendments operate prospectively unless language or purpose indicates otherwise)