251 F. Supp. 3d 579
S.D.N.Y.2017Background
- Plaintiffs are female current and former Goldman Sachs employees who allege systemic sex discrimination (pay, evaluation, promotion) under Title VII and the NYCHRL; Gamba and De Luis are intervenors added in 2015.
- Gamba worked at Goldman from 2001 until August 2014, alleges worse evaluations, lower pay, denial of promotion (including post‑maternity) and seeks reinstatement among other relief.
- De Luis worked at Goldman from 2010 until May 2016 (promoted to VP), alleges gender‑based pay and evaluation disparities; she requested a 2016 transfer to Miami, was denied and resigned, and alleges retaliation for participating in this litigation.
- Defendants moved to dismiss Gamba’s and De Luis’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief as lacking standing/moot; Plaintiffs moved to file an amended supplemental complaint re: De Luis’s departure under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d).
- The court rejected a prior district precedent (Chen‑Oster) reading Dukes to categorically bar former employees from seeking injunctive relief, held that former employees seeking reinstatement may have standing, denied the dismissal motions, and granted leave to file the amended supplemental complaint.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether former employees can seek injunctive/declaratory relief (standing) | Former employees seeking reinstatement have a concrete, redressable interest. | Dukes and Chen‑Oster bar ex‑employees from injunctive/declaratory relief. | Court rejects Chen‑Oster’s broad reading of Dukes; former employees seeking reinstatement may have standing. |
| When to measure an intervenor’s standing | Intervenors argue standing can relate back to the original complaint date. | Standing should be measured at time of motion to intervene. | Standing for intervenors measured at time of intervention; relation‑back does not apply to standing. |
| Mootness / feasibility of reinstatement as remedy | Plaintiffs contend reinstatement is feasible and appropriate to make them whole. | Defendants contend reinstatement is impossible (e.g., division eliminated) or moot after resignation. | Court: reinstatement is an equitable, fact‑specific remedy; defendants did not meet heavy burden to show reinstatement impossible; claims not moot. |
| Motion to file supplemental complaint under Rule 15(d) (De Luis) | Supplement adds post‑pleading events (transfer denial, resignation, EEOC right‑to‑sue) relevant to retaliation and reinstatement claims. | Defendants argue futility and insufficient allegations for Title VII/NYCHRL retaliation and NYCHRL geographic impact. | Court grants leave to supplement; finds De Luis adequately pleaded Title VII retaliation and plausible NYCHRL impact in NYC. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (addressing class certification limits under Rule 23(b)(2) and discussion of former employees’ claims)
- Comer v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 775 (2d Cir. 1994) (intervenor standing measured at time of motion to intervene)
- Tandem v. Captain’s Cove Marina of Bridgeport, Inc., 752 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 2014) (standard for resolving 12(b)(1) factual disputes)
- Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 457 F.3d 224 (2d Cir. 2006) (preference for reinstatement as Title VII remedy)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (retaliation adverse‑action standard: acts that would dissuade reasonable worker)