438 P.3d 381
Or.2019Background
- The U.S. Supreme Court’s Teague framework generally bars retroactive application of new constitutional rules on collateral review, except (1) substantive rules that place certain conduct beyond criminal law and (2) "watershed" procedural rules. Teague, however, arose in federal habeas context.
- Danforth held Teague’s general nonretroactivity principle governs federal habeas relief as a matter of statutory scope, while Montgomery treated Teague’s first exception (new substantive rules) as constitutionally retroactive for state collateral review.
- Oregon’s 1959 Post-Conviction Act (ORS 138.510–138.680) made statutory post-conviction petitions the exclusive state remedy for collateral challenges and included ORS 138.530(1)(a) (relief when a "substantial denial" of constitutional rights rendered the conviction void) and ORS 138.530(2) (do not deny relief that would have been available under the writ of habeas corpus before May 26, 1959).
- Petitioner argued ORS 138.530(2) and ORS 138.530(1)(a) require that every new constitutional rule (federal or state) be applied retroactively in Oregon post-conviction proceedings.
- The Oregon Supreme Court analyzed textual usage of "writ of habeas corpus," historical state habeas practice before 1959, limited federal retroactivity prior to 1959, and Oregon precedent (including State v. Fair) bearing on retroactivity.
- Holding: ORS 138.530 does not mandate that all new constitutional rules be applied retroactively in Oregon post-conviction proceedings; the court affirmed the lower courts’ judgments and left Fair’s approach (case-by-case retroactivity) intact.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ORS 138.530(2) requires retroactive application of all new constitutional rules | ORS 138.530(2) preserves relief available under the pre-1959 writ of habeas, and federal/state habeas applied new rules retroactively, so the statute requires retroactivity | "Writ of habeas corpus" in the statute refers to the state writ; Oregon courts did not have a clear practice of retroactivity pre-1959; federal retroactivity pre-1959 was rare | ORS 138.530(2) does not require automatic retroactivity for all new rules; context and history do not support petitioner’s reading |
| Whether ORS 138.530(1)(a) mandates retroactivity when a new constitutional rule is announced | The statute grants relief for a "substantial denial" of constitutional rights that "rendered the conviction void," which petitioner reads to require retroactive application of every new rule | Text limits relief to "substantial" denials rendering the conviction void; "when" should not be read as "whenever;" statute may simply list grounds with petitioner bearing burden | ORS 138.530(1)(a) does not compel universal retroactivity; the text and context are inconsistent with petitioner’s absolute rule |
| Whether Oregon must follow a per se retroactivity rule or retain judicial discretion (per Fair) | Petitioner contends the statute reflects legislative intent to require retroactivity | State argues prior Oregon precedent (Fair) permits case-by-case retroactivity so long as federal minimums are met | Court upholds Fair: Oregon courts may decide retroactivity case-by-case and are not bound to apply all new rules retroactively |
Key Cases Cited
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (establishes general nonretroactivity on collateral review and two narrow exceptions)
- Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667 (1971) (concurrent discussion of retroactivity principles cited by Teague)
- Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008) (Teague’s nonretroactivity rule reflects scope of federal habeas relief under statute)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (Teague’s first exception—new substantive rules—must be given retroactive effect under the Constitution)
- Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (adopts Teague plurality reasoning)
- Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969) (noting retroactive application in federal habeas before 1963 was rare)
- Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to appellate review for indigents; plurality/concurring views on retroactivity)
- Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (applied Griffin retroactively in a per curiam opinion)
- State v. Fair, 263 Or. 383 (1972) (Oregon precedent allowing the court discretion to choose retroactivity or prospectivity for new rules)