Chaunte Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552

Ott, exonerated of a 1995 murder, sues Milwaukee police and city for civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §1983.
Ott served subpoenas on Wisconsin Crime Laboratory and Wisconsin Department of Corrections to obtain DNA-related documents.
State agencies moved to quash; district court denied; agencies appealed under collateral-order doctrine.
Ott argues Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter forecloses collateral-order review for nonparties and privileged-material concerns.
The district court allowed briefing on exceptions to waiver; the court ordered production; agencies appealed.
Court ultimately dismisses for lack of jurisdiction, finding Mohawk controls and merits lack.
The opinion discusses whether Rule 45 subpoenas may be served by certified mail, and whether states can be treated as “persons” under Rule 45 in this context.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether collateral-order review is available for a nonparty subpoena order post-Mohawk.	Ott. Mohawk overruns existing nonparty appeal rule.	State agencies contend collateral-order review remains available.	No collateral-order jurisdiction; Mohawk bars it.
Whether state agencies are “persons” under Rule 45 for subpoenas.	Yousuf-style reasoning extends to state agencies.	States qualify as persons under Rule 45.	States qualify as persons under Rule 45.
Whether service by certified mail satisfies Rule 45(b)(1).	Certified-mail service is permissible via agent of the Postal Service.	Rule 45 requires usable service; no explicit ban on certified mail.	Certified mail compliance is acceptable under Rule 45.
Whether the state agencies preserved substantive objections given waiver.	Reservation preserved substantive objections.	Objections were not timely or adequately specified.	Waiver adequate; substantive objections not preserved.
If jurisdiction existed, would the merits support the subpoena denial?	Privilege and other protections merit protection.	No error in ordering compliance given lack of procedural issues.	Even if jurisdiction existed, merits meager; order would stand.

Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599 (2009) (collateral-order review narrowed; waives broad access to privilege issues)
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (collateral-order doctrine foundations; finality concept)
Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (narrow, selective collateral orders; need for finality)
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368 (1981) (efficient administration concerns in collateral orders)
Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345 (2006) (limits of collateral-order jurisdiction)
Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364 (1966) (courts’ power to enforce orders via contempt)
Tillman v. City of Milwaukee, 715 F.2d 354 (1983) (state agency as a ‘person’ under Rule 19(a))
Illinois v. Illinois, 454 F.2d 297 (1966) (state treated as ‘person’ under Rule 14; legislative environment concept)
Sims v. United States, 359 U.S. 108 (1959) (government entity’s status as ‘person’ depends on rule environment)
Yousuf v. Samantar, 451 F.3d 248 (2006) (federal agency as ‘person’ under Rule 45; relevance to states)
U.S. v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256 (1995) (standard of review for Rule 45 objections)