Chastain v. Geary, 539 S.W.3d 841

Chastain was a leader of a Light Rail Committee that drafted and circulated an initiative petition under the Kansas City Charter to place a light-rail ordinance on the ballot; the committee submitted a draft to City Attorney Geary for pre-circulation legal review and incorporated his suggested revisions.
The City Clerk found the submitted petition in proper form and the City Council referred it to its Transportation & Infrastructure Committee; Geary appeared at that committee hearing and stated the initiative was "illegal," without disclosing his prior review or suggested revisions, and asked that the committee's attorney not attend.
The initiative nevertheless was placed on the ballot and defeated by voters. Chastain sued Geary (in Geary's official capacity) for malfeasance and the committee's attorney for malpractice; claims against the attorney were dismissed for lack of standing and not appealed.
The trial court dismissed Chastain's malfeasance claims against Geary; the dismissal was initially issued as an order but later amended by an Order Nunc Pro Tunc to be denominated "Judgment of Dismissal." Chastain appealed.
The appellate court considered (1) whether a final, appealable judgment existed given the nunc pro tunc amendment, (2) whether Chastain's notice of appeal was sufficient, and (3) whether Chastain had standing individually to sue for harms to the committee.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Final judgment / appealability	Chastain treated the March dismissal as final and appealed; nunc pro tunc should allow appeal to proceed	Geary argued no final judgment existed because the dismissal order was not denominated a "judgment" and the docket entry was unsigned	Court found the trial court’s nunc pro tunc clearly intended to denominate the prior order as a final judgment; appeal allowed from May 16, 2017 nunc pro tunc judgment
Notice of appeal sufficiency	Chastain contended his notice was a good-faith attempt to appeal the dismissal	Geary argued notice named wrong date and attached unrelated order, so appeal defective	Court held the notice, though flawed, was in good faith and did not irreparably harm Geary; appeal not dismissed
Standing to sue individually	Chastain asserted personal standing to sue Geary for alleged malfeasance	Geary argued any alleged wrong was to the committee (a multi-member petition committee), not to Chastain individually	Court held Chastain lacked individual standing because section 731 requires the petition be filed by a committee of electors, so any harm was to the committee; dismissal affirmed
Sovereign immunity (alternative ground)	Chastain alleged malfeasance actionable despite immunity	Geary argued he was performing governmental functions and entitled to sovereign immunity	Court did not reach merits on immunity because lack of standing was dispositive; dismissal affirmed

City of St. Louis v. Hughes, 950 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. banc 1997) (clarifies final-judgment requirement for appeals)
Manzer v. Sanchez, 967 S.W.2d 268 (Mo. App. E.D. 1998) (order dismissing with prejudice is not final unless denominated "judgment")
Brooks v. Brooks, 98 S.W.3d 530 (Mo. banc 2003) (permits nunc pro tunc judgment where trial court’s intent to finalize is clear)
Amoso Realty, LLC v. Milton, 513 S.W.3d 373 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016) (separate docket entry and written order cannot be combined to satisfy Rule 74.01)
Orf v. Orf, 208 S.W.3d 306 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006) (signed order not denominated "judgment" plus unsigned docket entry is not final)
Davidson Ins. Agency, Ltd. v. West Plains R-7 School Dist., 235 S.W.3d 89 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (standing is jurisdictional and must be resolved first)
Jones v. Rennie, 690 S.W.2d 164 (Mo. App. E.D. 1985) (individual lacks standing when wrongs are to a corporation/entity rather than the individual)
Sequa Corp. v. Cooper, 128 S.W.3d 69 (Mo. App. E.D. 2003) (shareholder has no individual standing for corporate injuries)