Charmin Watson v. Landmark Urology, P.S.C., 2020 SC 0587

In Nov. 2012 Dr. Amberly Windisch performed a transvaginal mid‑urethral mesh sling on Charmin Watson; Watson signed an informed‑consent form that specifically listed bleeding, infection, damage to urethra/bladder, and incomplete emptying. Educational pamphlets and a clinic discussion were also documented.
Post‑op, Watson had transient retention, partial improvement, but in 2014 another urologist discovered mesh erosion into the bladder/urethra requiring reconstructive removal.
The Watsons filed malpractice suit in 2014 alleging negligence in performance and diagnosis; the complaint did not expressly plead an informed‑consent claim.
Watsons’ expert (Dr. Tracey Wilson) criticized lack of mesh‑specific warnings but expressly declined to offer an opinion that Windisch breached the informed‑consent standard; Windisch’s experts testified consent/disclosures met the applicable standard.
On summary judgment the trial court concluded no genuine issue of material fact on informed consent existed because the signed consent form and records, coupled with absence of expert proof that Windisch deviated from the accepted standard, defeated the claim; Court of Appeals and Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed.
The Supreme Court also held that a medical‑malpractice claim based on lack of informed consent must be specifically pled (notice pleading alone is insufficient for this particular type of malpractice claim), though courts should allow amendment when appropriate.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether summary judgment on informed‑consent claim was improper under KRS 304.40‑320	Watson: Windisch failed to disclose mesh‑specific substantial risks (erosion/migration) creating triable issue	Windisch: signed consent, documentation, and lack of any expert opinion that she breached the accepted standard mean no genuine issue	Affirmed: summary judgment proper — consent form/records + no expert showing deviation defeat claim
Whether plaintiff’s expert testimony created a disputed standard‑of‑care issue	Watson: Dr. Wilson’s criticisms show disagreement about adequate disclosures	Windisch: Dr. Wilson did not opine that Windisch violated the informed‑consent standard; her testimony reflected personal practice, not evidence of the profession’s accepted standard	Held: Dr. Wilson’s testimony insufficient to create triable issue because she did not offer an opinion that Windisch deviated from the accepted standard
Whether an informed‑consent malpractice claim may be raised by a general malpractice pleading	Watson: general malpractice notice pleading suffices	Windisch: failure to specifically plead informed consent deprived defendant of fair notice and discovery on that issue	Held: informed‑consent malpractice must be specifically pled (not just a general malpractice count), but courts should permit amendment when warranted

Sargent v. Shaffer, 467 S.W.3d 198 (Ky. 2015) (discussed informed‑consent statute requirements and objective reasonable‑person inquiry)
Argotte v. Harrington, 521 S.W.3d 550 (Ky. 2017) (addressed proof of professional standard in informed‑consent claims)
Univ. Med. Ctr. v. Shwab, 628 S.W.3d 112 (Ky. 2021) (reaffirmed informed consent is a process, clarified need for expert testimony to show what constitutes a "substantial" risk among providers)
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Serv. Ctr., Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991) (summary judgment standard — only where respondent cannot produce evidence to support a favorable verdict)
Holton v. Pfingst, 534 S.W.2d 786 (Ky. 1975) (held lack of informed consent is a negligence‑based medical‑malpractice claim)
Kovacs v. Freeman, 957 S.W.2d 251 (Ky. 1997) (recognized informed consent as a process, not merely a form)