Charlotte J. Cartwright v. DMC-Memphis Inc. d/b/a Delta Medical Center
468 S.W.3d 517
| Tenn. Ct. App. | 2014Background
- Charlotte Cartwright (next of kin) alleged medical malpractice causing her spouse’s death in May 2010; initial suit filed May 6, 2011 (within one‑year statute of limitations).
- Pre‑suit notices accompanying the May 2011 complaint omitted the patient’s DOB and claimant’s address and included HIPAA‑noncompliant authorizations; defendants moved to dismiss for noncompliance.
- Plaintiff voluntarily nonsuited the May 2011 action on September 9, 2011; she re‑sent pre‑suit notices and refiled a new complaint on February 29, 2012.
- Defendants moved to dismiss the refiled suit as time‑barred, arguing the first suit was void for failure to comply with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29‑26‑121, so the savings statute (Tenn. Code Ann. § 28‑1‑105) did not apply.
- Trial court agreed and dismissed; Cartwright appealed, also advancing constitutional challenges to § 29‑26‑121 (which the court below rejected).
- The Court of Appeals reversed, holding Rule 3 (commencement by filing) controls the savings statute; noncompliance with pre‑suit notice may lead to dismissal but does not prevent the initial filing from constituting a “commencement” under the savings statute.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether failure to comply with § 29‑26‑121 in the first suit prevents that filing from "commencing" the action for purposes of the savings statute | The May 6, 2011 filing commenced the action; savings statute tolls limitations despite defective pre‑suit notices | The first suit was void ab initio because required pre‑suit notice was not given; therefore no commencement to toll limitations | Held: Rule 3 governs commencement; filing alone commences the action. Defective pre‑suit notice may justify dismissal but does not negate commencement for the savings statute. |
| Whether § 29‑26‑121 alters Rule 3’s definition of commencement | § 29‑26‑121 does not change Rule 3; commencement still occurs on filing | § 29‑26‑121 must be satisfied before commencement; failure means the suit never properly began | Held: § 29‑26‑121 does not alter the Rule 3 commencement rule; the statute’s requirements do not prevent a filing from commencing an action for savings statute purposes. |
| Whether the refiled complaint (Feb 2012) was timely under the savings statute after a voluntary nonsuit | Refiled complaint is timely because original filing commenced the action and tolling applies | Timely only if original suit was valid; because notice was defective it was not, so refile is untimely | Held: Refiled complaint is timely under Tenn. Code Ann. § 28‑1‑105; trial court erred in dismissal. |
| Need to decide constitutional challenges to § 29‑26‑121 | Raised but not necessary if savings statute resolves the appeal | Defendants defended constitutionality below | Held: Constitutional challenges pretermitted as unnecessary given disposition on savings statute issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Frye v. Blue Ridge Neuroscience Ctr., 70 S.W.3d 710 (Tenn. 2002) (Rule 3 defines commencement by filing)
- Rajvongs v. Wright, 432 S.W.3d 808 (Tenn. 2013) (pre‑suit notice does not alter Rule 3 commencement)
- Myers v. AMISUB (SFH), Inc., 382 S.W.3d 300 (Tenn. 2012) (statutory construction principles; pre‑suit notice mandatory)
- Stevens ex rel. Stevens v. Hickman Cmty. Health Care Servs., Inc., 418 S.W.3d 547 (Tenn. 2013) (pre‑suit notice noncompliance can lead to dismissal)
- Henley v. Cobb, 916 S.W.2d 915 (Tenn. 1996) (savings statute favors notice to defendant over technical form)
- McGee v. Jacobs, 236 S.W.3d 162 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (purpose and operation of savings statute)
- Freeman v. Marco Transp. Co., 27 S.W.3d 909 (Tenn. 2000) (savings statute to be liberally construed)
- Old Hickory Eng'g & Mach. Co. v. Henry, 937 S.W.2d 782 (Tenn. 1996) (an action is commenced by filing a complaint)