Charlie Jackson v. R. Fong
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 16759
| 9th Cir. | 2017Background
- Charles Jackson (prisoner at San Quentin) filed a pro se § 1983 suit in June 2012 while incarcerated, alleging denial of mental-health treatment by three prison doctors.
- Jackson filed administrative health-care appeals in California; his second-level appeal was denied, his third-level appeal remained pending when he filed suit, and CDCR later cancelled the third-level appeal after his December 2012 release.
- Jackson notified the district court of his release, withdrew injunctive requests, and was permitted to amend; he filed a third amended (operative) complaint on March 7, 2013 as a non-prisoner, alleging Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference and naming the Doctors.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment arguing Jackson failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by the PLRA (42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)); the district court granted summary judgment on that basis.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit considered whether PLRA exhaustion is measured at the time the action is initiated or at the time the operative (amended) complaint is filed, and whether a post-release operative complaint by an ex-prisoner can avoid an exhaustion defense.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that a plaintiff who was in custody when he initiated suit but was free when he filed his operative amended complaint is not a "prisoner" subject to the PLRA exhaustion defense; a concurrence would have reached the same outcome by finding exhaustion excused.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether PLRA exhaustion applies when plaintiff was a prisoner at initial filing but was released before filing the operative amended complaint | Jackson: PLRA does not apply to his operative claims because he was not a prisoner when he filed the third amended complaint | Doctors: Exhaustion measured at initiation of the action; Jackson must have exhausted before the original filing | Held: Operative complaint controls; Jackson was not a prisoner when he filed it, so PLRA exhaustion defense does not apply |
| Whether Rule 15/15(d) amendment/supplementation can cure PLRA exhaustion defects | Jackson: Amendment/supplemental pleading supersedes the original and governs exhaustion analysis | Doctors: PLRA requires exhaustion as of the filing of the action, not later amendments | Held: Federal Rules (Rule 15/15(d)) govern; amended/supplemental complaint supersedes earlier pleading for exhaustion purposes |
| Whether policy concerns (gaming the system) justify denying amendment to avoid PLRA | Jackson: He promptly informed court of release and did not game process | Doctors: Allowing post-release amendments rewards failure to exhaust and discourages use of prison appeals | Held: District court discretion can police bad faith; policy concerns insufficient to override Federal Rules—no evidence of gamesmanship here |
| Whether equitable doctrines may excuse exhaustion when administrative remedies were rendered unavailable | Jackson (alternative): Exhaustion impossible because CDCR cancelled appeal after release | Doctors: Did not rely on equitable exception | Held: Court did not rely on equitable exception for reversal, but concurrence noted circumstances could justify excusal and would have found effective exhaustion here |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007) (PLRA exhaustion analysis should not deviate from ordinary Federal Rules practice)
- Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2014) (failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense; summary judgment framework applies)
- Rhodes v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2010) (amended/supplemental complaint can supersede earlier complaint for PLRA purposes)
- Page v. Torrey, 201 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2000) (PLRA exhaustion requirement applies only to "prisoners"—those currently detained)
- Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (PLRA requires proper exhaustion of available administrative remedies)
- Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016) (administrative remedies are required only if they are capable of use; official availability does not always mean practicable availability)