CHARLES S. TURNER,CHRISTOPHER D. TURNER,RUSSELL L. OVERTON, LEVY ROUSE, CLIFTON E. YARBOROUGH, KELVIN D. SMITH, & TIMOTHY CATLETT, 116 A.3d 894

Background

In 1985 seven defendants (appellants) were convicted of kidnapping, armed robbery, and felony murder for the October 1, 1984 murder of Catherine Fuller; convictions were affirmed on direct appeal.
Two cooperating witnesses (Alston and Bennett) pleaded guilty and provided central testimony identifying appellants as participants in a group attack; other eyewitnesses and inculpatory admissions corroborated a multi-perpetrator narrative. Yarborough’s videotaped statement placed him at the scene and was shown to the jury.
About 25 years later appellants moved under D.C. Code § 23-110 and the Innocence Protection Act (IPA) asserting (1) Brady violations for the government's nondisclosure of exculpatory/impeachment evidence (including alley witnesses who heard groans, information linking James McMillan and James Blue, and impeachment material), and (2) newly discovered evidence/recantations showing actual innocence; Yarborough also alleged ineffective assistance for failure to investigate his cognitive impairments to suppress his videotaped statement.
The Superior Court held a multiweek evidentiary hearing in 2012, found the recantations (particularly Alston and Bennett) not credible, and concluded nondisclosed evidence was not material under Brady and would not undermine confidence in the verdicts; it also rejected Yarborough’s ineffective assistance claim for lack of prejudice.
The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed: it applied the Brady three-part framework (favorability, suppression, materiality), treated materiality as a mixed legal-factual question (reviewed de novo subject to factual findings), rejected IPA relief because recantations were incredible and new evidence was not sufficiently probative, and held Yarborough failed to show a reasonable probability suppression would have succeeded or changed the verdict.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Brady nondisclosure of alternative-perpetrator evidence (alley witnesses, McMillan, Blue)	Withheld statements (Watts/Luchie/Murphy), IDs and investigative leads on McMillan and Davis’s accusation against Blue were favorable and would have supported a single- or few-perpetrator defense, undermining the group-attack proof.	The withheld items were weak/untrustworthy or inadmissible (Davis hearsay), would not have contradicted multiple eyewitnesses and the cooperating confessors, and thus were not material.	Denied: nondisclosure was not material—no reasonable probability the verdict would differ; Davis’s accusation inadmissible hearsay and McMillan evidence would not have shown appellants’ exclusion.
IPA (actual innocence based on new evidence and recantations)	Recantations by Alston, Bennett, and others plus expert opinion and new evidence (McMillan later murder) establish actual innocence by preponderance/clear and convincing evidence.	Recantations are incredible and unreliable; experts could not definitively limit number of assailants; later events (1992 murder) are not Brady-relevant and do not prove exclusion of appellants.	Denied: motions judge credited government witnesses and rejected recantations; appellate court deferred to credibility findings and held appellants failed to prove actual innocence by required standard.
Ineffective assistance re: failure to investigate Yarborough’s cognitive deficits to suppress videotaped statement	Counsel should have investigated intellectual impairments (low IQ, suggestibility) and used them to challenge voluntariness; had counsel done so, suppression would likely have succeeded and affected verdict.	Even if counsel had investigated, the totality shows voluntariness: Yarborough’s taped demeanor, admissions, Miranda waiver, and his own 2012 testimony alleging physical coercion (not suggestibility) refute that mental deficits produced involuntary statements; suppression still unlikely.	Denied: court assumed deficient performance for argument’s sake but found no reasonable probability that a suppression motion based on limitations would have succeeded or changed the verdict; no prejudice shown.
Admissibility / Due process re: out-of-court accusation by Ammie Davis (Blue)	Davis’s statement implicating Blue should have been disclosed and admitted (or would have led to admissible proof); exclusion violated due process (Chambers-like exception).	Davis’s hearsay was unreliable, inadmissible, and she was unavailable; Chambers inapposite—her statements lacked reliability indicia and did not fit recognized exceptions.	Held: Davis’s hearsay was inadmissible; Chambers does not require admission here; at most the statement would show investigative lapse but was not materially likely to change the outcome.

Key Cases Cited

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution must disclose materially favorable evidence to defendant)
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard: reasonable probability that undisclosed evidence would affect outcome)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality assessed cumulatively; government duty regardless of request)
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (due process may require admission of out-of-court confessions in rare circumstances where evidentiary rules undermine reliability and the defense)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (admissibility standard for third-party perpetrator evidence under D.C. law)
Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094 (D.C. 2011) (Brady and impeachment evidence materiality principles reaffirmed)