925 F.3d 749
5th Cir.2019Background
- In 1994 Charles Raby was convicted of capital murder for killing Edna Franklin and sentenced to death; he confessed and state and federal courts rejected prior habeas challenges.
- Raby sought post-conviction DNA testing under Texas Code Crim. Proc. art. 64; testing of fingernail clippings produced a weak, mixed male profile not matching Raby or Franklin’s grandsons; nightshirt lost; underwear contained only Franklin’s blood.
- HPD crime-lab deficiencies (the Bromwich Report) later revealed procedural problems; Raby alleges lab conduct and withheld/false serology reports undermined his conviction.
- Raby moved for authorization to file a second-or-successive federal habeas petition raising four claims: destruction of evidence (Trombetta/Youngblood), Giglio (false testimony), Brady (withholding exculpatory evidence), and actual innocence.
- AEDPA requires court authorization for successive petitions and a prima facie showing under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B): diligence in discovering the factual predicate and clear-and-convincing proof that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable juror would convict.
- The Fifth Circuit reviewed each claim and denied authorization, concluding Raby failed to make the required prima facie showing that any claim would satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Destruction/preservation of evidence (Trombetta/Youngblood) | Raby: HPD analyst Chu ran a consumptive Lattes test late, destroying exculpatory value and showing bad faith | State: No proof of bad faith; lab errors reflect poor training, not intentional destruction; exculpatory value not obvious at time | Denied — Raby fails to show bad faith or that evidence’s exculpatory value was obvious when tested/destructed |
| Giglio (false testimony/impeachment) | Raby: Chu and lead detective mischaracterized serology as “inconclusive,” hiding exculpatory A-type activity that would have impeached case | State: Testimony resulted from lab deficiencies, not knowing use of false testimony; serology did not exclude Raby and prosecutors did not know of falsity | Denied — Raby cannot show by clear and convincing evidence that, but for alleged Giglio error, no reasonable juror would convict |
| Brady (suppression of exculpatory evidence) | Raby: State withheld serology showing unidentified A antigen on fingernails and lab tests finding no blood on his clothing | State: Trial record shows State opened its file; defense counsel likely received reports; no showing of suppression or materiality | Denied — Raby fails to show suppression/materiality sufficient to undermine confidence in verdict |
| Actual innocence (freestanding claim) | Raby: Newly available DNA/serology undermines guilt and confession | State: AEDPA and Fifth Circuit precedent do not recognize freestanding innocence claims for habeas; only allows innocence to overcome procedural bars | Not reached on merits — Court declines to entertain freestanding innocence and only considers innocence to the extent it supports overcoming AEDPA filters; Raby did not meet those standards |
Key Cases Cited
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (limits due-process duty to preserve evidence to items expected to play a significant role in defense)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (failure to preserve potentially useful evidence requires bad faith to violate due process)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (prosecution must disclose or correct promised/impeachment material and is responsible for false testimony)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates due process)
- Bagley v. United States, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (defines ‘material’ in Brady context as probability sufficient to undermine confidence in outcome)
- Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (Brady materiality assessed by whether suppressed evidence could put the whole case in a different light)
- McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013) (actual-innocence gateway may allow review of otherwise barred federal habeas claims)
- In re Campbell, 750 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2014) (prima facie standard for authorization to file successive habeas petitions)