Charles Plymail v. Patrick Mirandy, 671 F. App'x 869

Petitioner Charles F. Plymail filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition after a criminal conviction; the district court dismissed it without prejudice for failure to exhaust state remedies.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took over 20 years to decide Plymail’s direct appeal.
The state court attributed much of the delay to Plymail’s contentious relationships with appointed counsel, but the federal record lacks most state-court filings and shows some delay not clearly attributable to Plymail (e.g., Plymail obtained a writ of mandamus ordering resentencing to permit appeal).
Plymail alleged a life‑threatening medical condition impeded his ability to pursue appeal and also had a state habeas petition pending for several years while the direct appeal remained undecided.
The magistrate judge and district court relied on the state court’s allocation of blame for delay and the pendency of state habeas proceedings to dismiss for non‑exhaustion; the Fourth Circuit found the record insufficient to decide exhaustion as a matter of law.

Issue	Plymail's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether exhaustion was required given the 20‑year delay in the state direct appeal	Delay and state inaction rendered state remedies unavailable/ineffective; exhaustion should be excused	Dismiss because state remedies remain available and delay was largely caused by Plymail’s conduct	Dismissal for failure to exhaust was premature given the incomplete record; COA granted and case remanded
Whether state inaction/dilatoriness can excuse exhaustion	Inordinate delay by state can render remedies ineffective and excuse exhaustion	Delay largely attributable to petitioner’s conduct; exhaustion not excused	Circuit recognized state delay could excuse exhaustion and that record did not permit resolving causation as a matter of law
Whether a certificate of appealability (COA) should issue	COA warranted because procedural ruling is debatable and claim of constitutional denial is debatable	COA should be denied because dismissal on procedural grounds was proper	COA granted because reasonable jurists could debate the procedural ruling and the merits question about due‑process violation from delay
Whether the 20‑year delay may constitute a due‑process violation	Long delay may amount to a due‑process violation under relevant precedent	State disputes that delay rose to constitutional magnitude and blames petitioner for delay	Circuit said reasonable jurists could debate whether the delay violated due process; remanded without deciding the merits

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (standards for COA when relief denied on procedural grounds)
Gordon v. Braxton, 780 F.3d 196 (4th Cir. 2015) (exhaustion principles for § 2254 petitions)
Jones v. Sussex I State Prison, 591 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2010) (exhaustion and state‑remedy requirements)
Farmer v. Circuit Court of Md. for Balt. Cty., 31 F.3d 219 (4th Cir. 1994) (state inaction/delay may render exhaustion ineffective)
Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338 (3d Cir. 2004) (long delay can excuse exhaustion; eight‑year delay analysis)
Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1990) (state dilatoriness can make exhaustion futile)
United States v. Johnson, 732 F.2d 379 (4th Cir. 1984) (undue appellate delay may violate due process)