Charles Momah v. Jeffrey Uttecht, 699 F. App'x 604

Dr. Charles Momah, a gynecologist, was convicted in Washington state court of multiple rapes of patients.
Pretrial publicity prompted the trial court to summon over 100 prospective jurors and conduct individual voir dire questioning of some jurors in chambers with only the defendant, counsel, and reporter present (temporary closure of the courtroom).
Momah appealed in state court; the Washington Supreme Court found state constitutional error for the closure but denied relief and implicitly rejected a federal Sixth Amendment public-trial claim. State postconviction petitions were denied.
Momah filed a federal habeas petition under AEDPA; the district court found the voir dire closure was constitutional error but denied relief because the Washington Supreme Court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding Presley v. Georgia postdated the state court decision and that, under existing precedent, the state court’s resolution was not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law; a certificate expansion on ineffective-assistance claims was denied.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether temporary in-chambers voir dire violated the Sixth Amendment public-trial right	Momah: Sixth Amendment public-trial right extends to voir dire; closure violated that right	State/Respondent: No clearly established Supreme Court precedent then extended the right to voir dire; waiver and harmlessness doctrines apply	Court: No unreasonable application of clearly established law; Presley was decided after state court, so AEDPA bars relief
Whether Presley v. Georgia controls Momah’s claim	Momah: Presley establishes that voir dire is protected and requires relief	State: Presley was decided after the state court’s adjudication and cannot be applied retroactively under AEDPA/Gree ne	Court: Presley came too late to render the state decision unreasonable under AEDPA
Whether waiver or failure to object bars relief	Momah: He did not waive right / trial counsel should have objected	State: Failure to object can constitute waiver; Peretz/Levine support waiver doctrine	Court: State could reasonably rely on waiver doctrine; waiver and harmlessness doctrines permit denying relief
Whether trial error required automatic reversal / new trial	Momah: Closure infected trial fairness and requires reversal	State: Waller/Neder/Glebe permit upholding conviction absent error that infects entire trial	Court: Temporary closure did not necessarily render trial fundamentally unfair; no automatic reversal required

Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39 (sets the framework for courtroom closure analysis)
Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (public right of access principles)
Presley v. Georgia, 558 U.S. 209 (voir dire and public trial right; decided after the state decision)
Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (failure to object can waive public-trial right)
Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610 (discusses waiver of public trial right)
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1 (harmless-error and when automatic reversal is required)
Glebe v. Frost, 135 S. Ct. 429 (errors that infect the entire trial process are required for automatic reversal)
Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (focus on state-court precedent as of the time of decision for AEDPA review)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (certificate of appealability standard)
State v. Momah, 167 Wn.2d 140 (Washington Supreme Court decision denying relief)
United States v. Rivera, 682 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir.: some minimal exclusions may be too trivial to violate Sixth Amendment)