286 So.3d 143
Fla.2019Background
- Plaintiff Charles Lieupo was injured after battery acid spilled from a Simon’s Trucking tractor‑trailer; he was exposed while responding to tow the vehicle.
- Lieupo sued under section 376.313(3) of the 1983 Water Quality Assurance Act alleging strict liability and obtained a jury verdict of $5,211,500.
- Simon’s Trucking argued personal injury recovery is barred because Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer applied the 1970 Pollutant Discharge Act’s definition of “damage,” which excludes humans.
- The First District reversed the verdict based on Curd and certified the question whether §376.313(3) permits personal injury recovery.
- The Florida Supreme Court held that the 1983 act’s phrase “all damages” plainly includes personal injury, that the 1970 act’s restrictive definition applies only to the 1970 act, and receded from Curd’s application of the 1970 definition to the 1983 act.
- The Court quashed the First District decision and remanded for proceedings consistent with its ruling, emphasizing liberal construction of the 1983 act and textual analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether §376.313(3) permits recovery for personal injury | “All damages” in the 1983 act includes personal injury; 1970 definitions do not apply | Curd applied 1970 act definition excluding human injury, so personal injury is barred | Yes. §376.313(3) covers personal injury; the Court so holds |
| Whether Curd’s application of the 1970 act’s definition to the 1983 act is controlling | Curd misapplied the 1970 definition to a separate 1983 statute and should be receded from | Curd is precedent that supports excluding personal injury | The Court receded from Curd’s application as inconsistent with the plain text of the 1983 act |
Key Cases Cited
- Curd v. Mosaic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216 (Fla. 2010) (applied 1970 act definition of “damage” to claims under the 1983 act)
- Lopez v. Hall, 233 So. 3d 451 (Fla. 2018) (statutory interpretation begins with plain text)
- Holly v. Auld, 450 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1984) (rules for construing clear statutory language)
- City of Parker v. State, 992 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 2008) (courts do not look behind clear statutory language for intent)
- State v. Brake, 796 So. 2d 522 (Fla. 2001) (common words are given their ordinary meaning)