Charles Kinney v. State Bar of California, 708 F. App'x 409

Charles G. Kinney, proceeding pro se, sued the State Bar of California and the California Supreme Court under antitrust law and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging harms arising from California State Bar disciplinary proceedings.
The district court dismissed Kinney’s complaint and denied multiple post-judgment motions (leave to amend, default against the California Supreme Court, recusal, and motions to vacate).
The district court found Kinney’s claims barred by sovereign (Eleventh Amendment) immunity and implicated the Rooker–Feldman doctrine as a bar to relief that would effectively reverse state-court disciplinary rulings.
Kinney appealed the dismissals and post-judgment rulings to the Ninth Circuit. The panel reviewed the dismissal de novo and the other rulings for abuse of discretion.
The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding the State Bar and California Supreme Court are arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, amendment would be futile, the default was properly denied given lack of merit, and recusal/vacatur motions had no basis.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether claims against State Bar and CA Supreme Court are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity	Kinney asserted federal antitrust and §1981 claims arising from disciplinary proceedings	State actors argued they are arms of the state and immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment	Court: Barred by Eleventh Amendment; dismissal proper
Whether leave to amend should be granted	Kinney sought leave to amend to cure defects	Defendants argued amendment would be futile and claims are precluded by Rooker–Feldman	Court: Denial appropriate because amendment would be futile and Rooker–Feldman applies
Whether district court should have entered default against the California Supreme Court	Kinney sought default for failure to defend	California Supreme Court contended claims lacked merit and default was unwarranted	Court: No abuse of discretion denying default given lack of merit
Whether recusal and motion to vacate were warranted	Kinney argued judicial bias and procedural error justifying recusal and vacatur	Defendants maintained no grounds for recusal or Rule 59/60 relief	Court: Denials affirmed; Kinney failed to show basis for recusal or vacatur

Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2012) (standard for de novo review of dismissal)
Simmons v. Sacramento Cty. Superior Court, 318 F.3d 1156 (9th Cir. 2003) (California state courts are arms of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity)
Hirsh v. Justices of Supreme Court of State of Cal., 67 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 1995) (State Bar of California is an arm of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes)
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (U.S. 1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity applies to states and their agencies regardless of relief sought)
Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2011) (standard for dismissal without leave to amend when amendment would be futile)
Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772 (9th Cir. 2012) (Rooker–Feldman bars federal district jurisdiction over de facto appeals of state court judgments)
Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089 (9th Cir. 1980) (standard regarding denial of default judgment when claims lack merit)
United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010) (standards and grounds for judicial recusal)
Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255 (9th Cir. 1993) (standards for relief under Rules 59(e) and 60(b))
Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2009) (court will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal)