Charles J. Hughes v. Tom Green County
573 S.W.3d 212
Tex.2019Background
- Decedent’s will gave mineral interests to SMU (to fund an endowed chair) and devised the house and residue to Tom Green County for the county library; heirs at law contested title to the minerals.
- SMU sought court authority to redirect excess mineral proceeds; County intervened claiming excess proceeds under the residuary clause; Charles Hughes (heir) intervened asserting heirs’ title via a lapsed-bequest theory.
- Before mediation, the County and Hughes (heir) executed a Mutual Partial Assignment (MPA): cross-assigning 50% of mineral interests and 50% of any proceeds to eliminate their adversity and share control of prosecution/settlement; MPA included a conditional promise to name the library for the decedent if recovery was “substantial enough.”
- The County and heirs settled with SMU for $1 million; County and heirs split proceeds ($500,000 each). County later chose not to name the library for Hughes, instead naming major donors and honoring Hughes only in a small department; Hughes sued for breach of the MPA and other relief.
- County filed a plea to the jurisdiction asserting governmental immunity; trial court dismissed Hughes’s claims under the MPA; court of appeals affirmed, holding Lawson didn’t apply because (1) MPA was not a settlement and (2) County retained immunity in the SMU litigation.
- Supreme Court of Texas reversed: held County lacked immunity for the title claims in the SMU litigation, the MPA settled the parties’ adverse claims, and Lawson bars the County from asserting immunity in the subsequent enforcement suit.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the County is immune from suit on Hughes’s claim to enforce/seek damages for breach of the MPA | Hughes: Lawson prevents the government from creating immunity by settling a claim for which it lacks immunity; County cannot assert immunity to avoid enforcement | County: Its intervention did not waive immunity; MPA was a joint-defense agreement, not a settlement of claims for which immunity was absent | Held: County lacked immunity in the SMU litigation; MPA settled adverse claims; Lawson applies so County cannot assert immunity here |
| Whether the MPA was a settlement agreement that resolved the parties’ adverse claims | Hughes: MPA cross-assigned interests and control, eliminating adverse claims between County and heirs | County: MPA was a joint-defense/cooperation agreement that did not eliminate the parties’ claims against each other | Held: MPA was a settlement of the parties’ competing title claims (cross-assignments and division of proceeds eliminated their adversity) |
| Whether the County’s intervention waived/abrogated governmental immunity for opposing title claims (Reata principle) | Hughes: County’s voluntary intervention to assert title abrogated immunity as to adverse title claims under Reata; fairness requires allowing offsetting defenses | County: Their claims did not seek monetary relief against Hughes and thus Reata’s exception does not apply | Held: Reata applies—the County’s affirmative suit for title subjected it to adversary claims germane to and offsetting its claim; immunity did not bar those claims |
| Whether Lawson (government can’t create immunity by settling claims it lacked immunity on) applies here | Hughes: Lawson controls and prevents County from using immunity to escape a suit to enforce the settlement | County: Lawson limited to cases where immunity was statutorily waived; not applicable if no waiver involved | Held: Lawson applies broadly; no principled distinction between claims outside contours of immunity and claims within immunity but statutorily waived—County cannot claim immunity after settling claims it lacked immunity to resist |
Key Cases Cited
- Texas A&M Univ.–Kingsville v. Lawson, 87 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2002) (government may not create immunity by settling a claim it lacked immunity to defend)
- Reata Constr. Co. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006) (governmental entity that seeks affirmative relief is not immune from opposing claims germane and offsetting its claim)
- City of Dallas v. Albert, 354 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. 2011) (clarifies Reata as limiting contours of immunity rather than legislatively waiving it)
- Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2016) (discussion of the history and policy rationales for sovereign immunity)
- Brown & Gay Eng’g, Inc. v. Olivares, 461 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. 2015) (describing policy reasons for immunity and legislative role in waivers)
- C. Borunda Holdings, Inc. v. Lake Proctor Irrigation Auth., 540 S.W.3d 548 (Tex. 2018) (voluntary affirmative litigation by a governmental entity binds it to ordinary litigation responsibilities)