Charles J. Dalton, Jr. and Melissa Dalton v. Household Finance Corp., II
11972-VCMR
Del. Ch.Nov 18, 2016Background
- In 2007 the Daltons obtained a mortgage loan; they entered a Trial Period Plan Agreement with Household Finance on Jan. 14, 2015 requiring three trial payments to qualify for a modification.
- The third trial payment (due Apr. 12, 2015) failed to process; parties dispute whether Household Finance attempted withdrawal or the Daltons cancelled payment; Household Finance later sent a letter listing a wrong account number.
- The loan was sold to LSF9 in ~Nov. 2015 and servicing transferred to Caliber on Dec. 7, 2015; the Daltons sued LSF9 and Caliber on Feb. 9, 2016.
- The Daltons asserted claims for breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, violation of consent orders, unjust enrichment, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief to preserve the modification.
- LSF9 and Caliber moved to dismiss, arguing they were not parties or successors to the Trial Period Plan or consent orders, that unjust enrichment fails, and that the injunction prerequisites were unmet.
- The Court granted the motion to dismiss in full, concluding LSF9 and Caliber were neither parties nor successors, the consent‑order claim was inadequately pleaded, unjust enrichment failed, and injunction prerequisites were not shown.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether LSF9/Caliber liable for breach of Trial Period Plan or implied covenant as parties or successors | LSF9 and Caliber had notice of the modification and should incur successor liability; their conduct impaired Daltons’ rights under the plan | LSF9 and Caliber were not parties to the Plan and purchased the loan after the alleged breach; purchasers are not successors in interest | Denied: not parties or successors; breach and covenant claims dismissed |
| Whether LSF9/Caliber are bound by consent orders applicable to prior bank | Sale cannot evade consent orders; purchasers took subject to the orders | Daltons failed to allege LSF9/Caliber were signatories, successors, or affiliates bound by the consent orders | Denied: consent‑order claim inadequately alleged and dismissed |
| Unjust enrichment based on retention of two trial payments without principal reduction | LSF9/Caliber were unjustly enriched because payments were retained but principal not reduced | The principal reduction only triggered after all three payments; no allegation payments weren’t applied; Daltons have an adequate legal remedy against Household Finance | Denied: unjust enrichment not pleaded; claim dismissed |
| Preliminary/permanent injunction to preserve modification | Injunction required to prevent irreparable harm and preserve modification | Daltons cannot show reasonable probability of success on merits or imminent irreparable injury; no foreclosure or threat pending | Denied: injunction prerequisites unmet and claim unripe |
Key Cases Cited
- Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Capital Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531 (Del. 2011) (motion to dismiss reasonable‑conceivability standard)
- Allen v. Encore Energy P’rs, 72 A.3d 93 (Del. 2013) (when documents outside pleadings may be considered)
- Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2010) (elements of unjust enrichment)
- C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Empl.’s & Sanitation Ret. Tr., 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014) (standards for permanent injunction)
