Charles Hedlund v. Charles Ryan
815 F.3d 1233
9th Cir.2016Background
- In 1991 Hedlund and co-defendant McKinney committed a series of burglaries that culminated in the murders of Christene Mertens and Jim McClain; Hedlund was convicted of first-degree murder for McClain and sentenced to death, and convicted of second-degree murder for Mertens.
- They were tried together before dual juries; the trial court required both defendants to wear a visible leg brace for security during trial; one juror disclosed a distant relation to a victim but was retained after an in-chambers hearing.
- Hedlund challenged multiple trial and post-conviction issues (visible restraint, dual juries, juror bias, counsel performance during plea negotiations and penalty phase, and sentencing court’s consideration of mitigating evidence) through state PCR and federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
- Federal district court denied habeas relief; Ninth Circuit granted a COA on several claims and expanded COA to others on appeal.
- The Ninth Circuit majority affirmed denial of relief on claims about the leg brace, dual juries, juror bias, plea-phase and penalty-phase ineffective assistance, but found the Arizona Supreme Court violated Lockett/Eddings by applying a causal-nexus test to nonstatutory mitigation when independently reviewing the death sentence and remanded to grant relief as to sentence (per McKinney v. Ryan precedent).
- The panel issued concurring and partially dissenting opinions: Judge Bea concurred but disagreed with the en banc McKinney approach; Judge Wardlaw concurred in part and dissented in part on shackling and ineffective assistance issues.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Hedlund) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Visible leg brace at trial | Leg brace was visible and prejudicial; violated due process | Restraint was justified by essential state interest in courtroom security and minimally intrusive | Court: No constitutional violation; state courts’ factual findings reasonable and Holbrook applied properly |
| Use of dual juries | Dual juries prejudiced Hedlund and infringed trial rights | Dual juries were proper exercise of trial judge’s discretion with safeguards; no clearly established Supreme Court law forbidding them | Court: No habeas relief — Supreme Court hasn’t clearly addressed dual juries; no showing of constitutional prejudice |
| Juror bias (distant relation) | Juror’s distant relation required dismissal or new trial (implied bias) | Juror was forthcoming, hearing satisfied Remmer/Smith; no actual bias and implied-bias doctrine not clearly established | Court: No relief — trial held proper hearing; presumption of correctness not rebutted; no clear law for implied bias |
| Ineffective assistance during plea process | Counsel’s tactical recusal attempt caused loss of plea that might have avoided death | Counsel’s actions were tactical to avoid perceived bias; no reasonable probability judge would have accepted plea | Court: No Strickland/AEDPA relief — state PCR decision reasonable on performance and prejudice |
| Ineffective assistance during penalty phase | Counsel failed to develop / present neuropsych evidence of brain damage and mitigation | Counsel presented experts on brain function and alcoholism; additional post-conviction experts added little new matter; tactical choices reasonable | Court: No relief — PCR findings reasonable; counsel’s performance within wide range |
| Consideration of mitigating evidence (Lockett/Eddings) | Arizona Supreme Court applied causal-nexus rule excluding nonstatutory mitigation unless tied to crime, violating Lockett/Eddings | State relied on its precedent requiring nexus and on trial judge’s findings that mitigation didn’t affect conduct | Held: Habeas relief granted as to sentence — Arizona Supreme Court applied unconstitutional causal-nexus test; error was not harmless; remand to grant writ as to sentence (per en banc McKinney) |
Key Cases Cited
- Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (sentencer cannot be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating aspect of defendant’s character or offense)
- Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982) (sentencer may not refuse to consider relevant mitigating evidence as a matter of law)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong standard for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560 (1986) (physical restraints are inherently prejudicial and permissible only where justified by an essential state interest specific to the trial)
- Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (Remmer hearing with opportunity to prove actual bias satisfies due process)
- Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534 (1993) (severance and tailoring relief for antagonistic defenses is within court’s discretion)
- Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274 (2004) (rejects requirement of causal nexus between mitigating evidence and crime)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (standard for harmless error on habeas review: substantial and injurious effect)
- McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (Arizona Supreme Court’s causal-nexus application violated Eddings; applied here as binding precedent)