Charles Groves v. Tasaday Green
154 A.3d 507
Vt.2016Background
- Father and mother were biological parents of two children; long-term relationship with allegations of physical, sexual, and coercive conduct by father. Mother was primary caregiver and had homeschooled the children.
- Mother obtained an RFA (relief-from-abuse) order after an incident on Feb 28, 2015; criminal charges (including aggravated domestic assault and sexual-assault-related counts) were filed against father and remained pending during the Family Division hearings.
- Mother sought sole parental rights and an order denying father any parent-child contact under 15 V.S.A. § 665(f); family court awarded mother sole legal and physical rights and temporarily denied father all contact pending resolution of the criminal case.
- The family court declined to find by clear and convincing evidence that the children were conceived by sexual assault (the § 665(f) heightened standard), but found on § 665(b) best-interests factors that mother better met the children’s needs and the parties could not co-parent safely.
- The court imposed a procedural condition: father could file a motion for parent-child contact within 45 days after his criminal case was resolved; otherwise he would need to show a substantial, unanticipated change in circumstances to modify the no-contact order.
- Father appealed, arguing the order effectively terminated his parental rights without the clear-and-convincing finding required by Mullin and that conditioning resumption of contact on resolution of criminal charges was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Father) | Defendant's Argument (Mother / Court) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denying parent-child contact without a clear-and-convincing finding violated due process (Mullin rule) | Mullin requires clear-and-convincing proof before effectively terminating parental contact; the court made no such finding and disregarded evidence of a positive parent–child relationship. | The order was temporary in function pending the criminal case, so the Mullin clear-and-convincing standard for final termination did not apply; a lower standard (preponderance for temporary suspension) sufficed. | Affirmed: court’s order was temporary and permissible; Mullin’s elevated standard did not control. |
| Whether the court erred by conditioning any resumption of contact on resolution of criminal charges beyond father’s control | It was improper to make criminal-case resolution a prerequisite and to impose burdensome procedural requirements to seek contact. | The court permissibly deferred final contact determination until criminal resolution because of interrelated criminal proceedings, witness concerns (children), existing no-contact orders, and possible application of 15 V.S.A. § 665a. Father could move within 45 days after resolution. | Affirmed: deferral was reasonable and within the court’s discretion; the 45-day motion provision was appropriate. |
Key Cases Cited
- Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250, 647 A.2d 714 (Vt. 1994) (clear-and-convincing proof required before effectively terminating parent-child contact)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1982) (due-process standard for termination of parental rights)
- Begins v. Begins, 147 Vt. 295, 514 A.2d 719 (Vt. 1986) (compelled testimony with use-and-derivative-use immunity to protect Fifth Amendment rights in civil proceedings related to criminal charges)
- Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (U.S. 1972) (use and derivative-use immunity required when compelling testimony over Fifth Amendment privilege)