Charles Edward Sieloff v. State
05-14-01300-CR
| Tex. App. | Jul 31, 2015Background
- Appellant Charles Edward Sieloff III pled guilty to third-degree felony DWI (two prior DWI convictions) and asked for community supervision so he could receive treatment.
- Written plea paperwork stated the plea was "open as to community supervision." The trial court admonished Sieloff that punishment could be 2–10 years' confinement.
- At sentencing the trial court orally sentenced Sieloff to ten years' confinement and also ordered placement in the Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facility (SAFPF); the written judgment recited ten years' confinement but said nothing about SAFPF.
- Defense counsel later filed a motion for new trial alleging an oral agreement with the prosecutor that the State would "remain silent" as to community supervision/SAFPF; defense counsel attached his affidavit asserting he informed the court of that agreement.
- The State argued no breach occurred and that SAFPF can only be ordered as a condition of community supervision; the parties and court agreed the oral SAFPF order was unenforceable but disputed whether the variance affected substantial rights.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: (1) no prosecutorial breach of any plea agreement; and (2) the variance between the oral SAFPF pronouncement (unenforceable) and the written judgment (enforceable) did not affect Sieloff’s substantial rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether prosecutor breached plea agreement by urging prison sentence/arguing against community supervision | Sieloff: prosecutor breached an oral agreement to "make no statement" about punishment/SAFPF, rendering plea involuntary under Santobello | State: no enforceable plea term required silence; plea was open as to community supervision and record insufficient to show an enforceable oral agreement | No breach; court found plea was open and prosecutor’s comment did not violate an alleged agreement |
| Whether trial court erred by orally ordering SAFPF while imposing a prison sentence (conflict between oral pronouncement and written judgment) | Sieloff: oral order to SAFPF conflicts with written judgment and is improper because SAFPF can only be a community-supervision condition; requests reversal/remand to resolve incompatibility | State: oral SAFPF order was error and unenforceable; remedy is to treat written judgment (ten years) as controlling and vacate oral SAFPF order | Affirmed: oral SAFPF order unenforceable but variance did not affect substantial rights; written judgment controls |
Key Cases Cited
- Moore v. State, 295 S.W.3d 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (plea bargain is a contract between State and defendant; trial court only accepts/rejects plea)
- Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (U.S. 1971) (prosecutor must honor plea agreement; breach can render plea involuntary)
- Bitterman v. State, 180 S.W.3d 139 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (defendant has right to have State honor plea terms once court accepts plea)
- Hargrave v. State, 10 S.W.3d 355 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999) (prosecutor’s promise to "stand silent" does not necessarily create a binding plea bargain in open plea context)
- Dorsey v. State, 55 S.W.3d 227 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2001) (agreement not accepted/approved by court and open plea means no enforceable plea bargain requiring silence)
- Burt v. State, 445 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (sentence must be pronounced orally in defendant’s presence; oral pronouncement controls when conflict exists)
- Taylor v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (written judgment is declaration of oral pronouncement; oral controls when conflict exists)
- Mizell v. State, 119 S.W.3d 804 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (sentence not authorized by law is unenforceable)
- Ribelin v. State, 1 S.W.3d 882 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999) (variance between unenforceable oral sentence and enforceable written judgment examined for effect on substantial rights)
- Posey v. State, 300 S.W.3d 23 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009) (written judgment may stand when oral pronouncement is illegal; appellate review asks whether variance affected substantial rights)
- Ex parte Madding, 70 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (trial court lacks authority to orally pronounce one sentence and enter a different written judgment outside defendant’s presence)