Charles Edward Owens v. Gregory McLaughlin
2013 WL 5746381
11th Cir.2013Background
- In 1981 Rebecca Heath (nine months pregnant) was found shot dead in her car in Troup County, Georgia; her body was discovered in Georgia but there was conflicting evidence whether the killing occurred in Alabama.
- Georgia law treats venue as an essential element of the offense; the prosecution must prove venue beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Owens and co-defendant Lumpkin were convicted in Georgia of malice murder in 1984; Owens later faced separate proceedings in Alabama.
- At Owens’s Georgia trial the judge read the statutory venue instruction including the phrase “it shall be considered” that, if cause of death cannot be determined, the death is considered to have occurred in the county where the body was found.
- Owens argued on state and federal habeas review that the jury instruction created a mandatory presumption on venue in violation of Sandstrom and the Due Process Clause; he also argued the state’s 25-year delay in ruling his motion for a new trial violated due process.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed denial of habeas relief: it found the “shall be considered” language constituted a Sandstrom-type error but that the error was harmless under Brecht; the delay claim failed because no clearly established federal law requires a timely ruling on a motion for new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether jury instruction on venue impermissibly shifted burden of proof (Sandstrom error) | Owens: statutory phrase “shall be considered” created mandatory presumption that venue was Georgia, shifting burden to him to disprove venue | State: instruction as a whole and other jury instructions preserved the State’s burden; venue is not a traditional element like intent | Court: "shall be considered" could be read as mandatory (Sandstrom error), but error was harmless given overwhelming evidence supporting Georgia venue |
| Whether 25-year delay in ruling a motion for new trial violated due process | Owens: extreme delay prejudiced his rights and violated due process | State: no Supreme Court precedent establishes a constitutional right to speedy ruling on motions for new trial; Georgia courts did not unreasonably apply federal law | Court: No clearly established federal law requires timely ruling; claim fails under AEDPA and is not a due process violation |
Key Cases Cited
- Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979) (instructions creating mandatory presumption on an element violate due process)
- Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985) (assess whether jury could reasonably have understood instruction as shifting burden; review instructions as a whole)
- Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (harmless-error standard on federal habeas: whether error had substantial and injurious effect)
- In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (Due Process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every element)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA standards for "contrary to" or "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law)