Charles Daff v. Karen Good, 906 F.3d 1100

Judgment creditor Karen M. Good obtained two money judgments against Richard Swintek (assigned to her) and served an Order for Appearance and Examination (ORAP) on the debtor in June 2010, creating a one-year ORAP lien on his personal property under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 708.110(d).
The debtor filed Chapter 7 in August 2010; the bankruptcy automatic stay prevented Good from executing on the ORAP lien during the bankruptcy.
Good failed to renew the ORAP lien under state law before its one-year term expired in mid-2011 and later filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court seeking declaration that her ORAP lien had priority over the trustee.
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment for the trustee, holding § 108(c) (the tolling provision) did not apply to ORAP liens; the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel reversed, relying on Ninth Circuit precedent.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit remanded to resolve a factual dispute about service (service was confirmed), then addressed the legal question whether § 108(c) tolled the ORAP lien’s one‑year duration during the automatic stay.
The Ninth Circuit held § 108(c) tolled the ORAP lien period because executing on a lien is a continuation of the original action that produced the judgment; the BAP’s reversal was affirmed and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Good)	Defendant's Argument (Trustee Daff)	Held
Whether 11 U.S.C. § 108(c) tolls the one‑year ORAP lien period that expires during the automatic stay	§108(c) tolls the ORAP period because the creditor was prevented by the automatic stay from executing on the lien — execution is a continuation of the original action	ORAP enforcement is distinct from "commencing or continuing a civil action"; §362(a) separately stays enforcement, so §108(c) should not toll enforcement-type periods	Held: §108(c) tolled the ORAP one‑year period; execution on a lien is a continuation of the original action and is covered by §108(c)
Whether the expiration of an ORAP lien merely affects priority (not the underlying claim) and thus falls outside §108(c)	Tolling should apply even if expiration affects only priority because inability to enforce the judgment during the stay keeps the continuation period open	Expiration only affects secured priority; the underlying judgment survives and §108(c) targets commencement/continuation of actions, not priority changes	Held: distinction irrelevant; Ninth Circuit follows precedent treating enforcement periods as part of the continuing action, so tolling applies

In re Spirtos, 221 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2000) (held §108(c) tolls the renewal period for a California judgment that would expire during the automatic stay)
In re Hunters Run Ltd. P’ship, 875 F.2d 1425 (9th Cir. 1989) (§108(c) tolled period to enforce a mechanic’s lien because enforcement was part of a continuing action)
Morton v. Nat’l Bank of N.Y.C. (In re Morton), 866 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1989) (execution on a judgment lien is supplemental to the original action and tolling under §108(c) applies)
In re Hilde, 120 F.3d 950 (9th Cir. 1997) (describing how an ORAP lien is created by service and is distinctively secretive/perfected by service)
Burton v. Infinity Capital Mgmt., 862 F.3d 740 (9th Cir. 2017) (describing the broad scope and purposes of the automatic stay under §362)