Charles D. Wardwell v. John R. Duggins
136 A.3d 703
Me.2016Background
- Wardwell's land is burdened by a private easement over his servient parcel benefiting the Dugginses' dominant estate.
- The 1954 deed created the easement described as a right of way by foot or vehicle, 'as now laid out and used', from Hallowell Road to the dominant estate.
- The dominant estate passed through several owners, ultimately to the Dugginses in 2006; Wardwell acquired the servient estate in 2007.
- Historically, the easement was used for timber harvesting and transit; later Wardwell's property was damaged by Dugginses' improvements (gravel, culvert) to the right-of-way.
- In 2013 Wardwell sought a judicial declaration limiting the easement to exclude hunting and recreation; the Dugginses counterclaimed that their use was within the easement.
- The trial court found the deed language unambiguous but allowed extrinsic evidence to determine contemplated uses; it ultimately held the easement could include logging, hunting, and recreation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether hunting and recreation are within the easement scope. | Wardwell argues the grant did not contemplate hunting/recreation. | Dugginses contend uses align with traditional/easement purposes and precedents. | Yes; hunting and recreation are contemplated within scope. |
| Was the denial of Wardwell's Rule 59(e) motion an abuse of discretion? | Wardwell asserts lack of evidence to support inclusion of hunting/recreation. | Dugginses argue evidence supports the court's interpretation. | No; court did not abuse its discretion. |
| Is extrinsic evidence properly used to determine the scope when deed language is ambiguous? | Wardwell maintains no ambiguity to justify extrinsic evidence. | Dugginses rely on extrinsic evidence to identify contemplated uses. | Yes; extrinsic evidence permissible to discern intent. |
Key Cases Cited
- L aux v. Harrington, 2012 ME 18 (Me. 2012) (scope determined from deed language; extrinsic evidence permissible for intent)
- Anchors v. Manter, 1998 ME 152 (Me. 1998) (use of extrinsic evidence to ascertain parties' intent)
- Fine Line, Inc. v. Blake, 677 A.2d 1061 (Me. 1996) (interpretation of easement scope; ambiguity standard)
- Guild v. Hinman, 1997 ME 120 (Me. 1997) (reasonableness/foreseeability standard for contemplated uses)
- Pettee v. Young, 2001 ME 156 (Me. 2001) (foreseeability as criterion for easement scope)
- Sleeper v. Loring, 2013 ME 112 (Me. 2013) (extrinsic evidence and surrounding circumstances considered)