Charles Beal, Jr. v. James Beller
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 2439
7th Cir.2017Background
- On Sept. 11, 2007, Kenosha detectives Strelow and Beller acted on a tip that an African‑American man in a yellow shirt was selling heroin at a known high‑crime corner; they drove in an unmarked car and found Charles Beal standing in a driveway.
- Detectives told Beal they had received a tip and asked him to identify himself; he complied.
- Beller grabbed Beal’s wrist and Strelow frisked him; Strelow felt keys and a soft bulge (tissue), then emptied Beal’s pocket and discovered hollowed flashlight containing small baggies of suspected heroin.
- Beal was arrested, charged, moved to suppress; the state court granted the suppression motion and dismissed charges.
- Beal sued the detectives under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; the district court granted summary judgment for the detectives, finding the tip was not anonymous and the stop/frisk justified under Terry.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding genuine disputes of material fact (especially whether the tip was anonymous and whether officers had reasonable suspicion), and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Beal) | Defendant's Argument (Detectives) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the tip was anonymous | Detectives told him it was an anonymous tip; verified complaints and state charging documents support that | Detectives say the informant was known; amended complaint omits “anonymous”; reports say only “we received a tip” | Genuine factual dispute exists; court treated verified pleadings and other evidence as creating triable issue that tip may have been anonymous |
| Whether the stop and frisk were justified under Terry | No reasonable suspicion; anonymous/unverified tip alone insufficient to justify stop/frisk | Officers corroborated location/description, Beal made furtive movement, high‑crime area, tip identified him by name | Not compelled to find reasonable suspicion as a matter of law; factual disputes preclude summary judgment in favor of detectives |
| Whether subsequent pocket search and arrest were lawful | Frisk revealed non‑weapon items and was completed; further pocket search exceeded Terry scope | Frisk revealed bulge that could be narcotics and examination of keychain/flashlight provided probable cause | Court did not decide legality of the pocket search because initial stop/frisk presented triable issues; case remanded for factfinding |
| Whether detectives entitled to qualified immunity | Beal: disputed facts mean officers’ conduct may have violated clearly established Fourth Amendment rights | Detectives: acted on reasonable suspicion and established precedent supports their conduct | Qualified immunity not resolved in defendants’ favor at summary judgment because material facts are disputed |
Key Cases Cited
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (establishes stop‑and‑frisk reasonable‑suspicion standard)
- Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability does not justify stop‑and‑frisk)
- Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (anonymous tip with predictive details can supply reasonable suspicion)
- Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (reliability of informant relevant to reasonable suspicion)
- Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (911 calls and corroboration can support reasonable suspicion in certain contexts)
- Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861 (on summary judgment, courts must view facts in light most favorable to nonmoving party)