Charles Anthony Malouff, Jr. v. State
03-13-00723-CR
Tex. App.Jun 2, 2015Background
- Charles Malouff was indicted (re‑indicted) for Securing Execution of a Document by Deception arising from a grant application for wind turbines submitted for the City of Jonestown; the jury convicted him and he received 15 years' imprisonment.
- The application contained representations about CM Alternative Energies’ technology and lack of conflicts; Mary Jo Woodall (intimate partner and Comptroller’s grant coordinator) helped with the application and did not disclose the relationship.
- The City notified parties it would disassemble the turbines; the State notified Malouff’s prior counsel but the turbines were later disassembled and some materials were not preserved.
- During trial the State’s financial analyst’s spreadsheets (work product) were discovered late; the court ruled they were Brady material, ordered production, and the defense sought continuances and funding for experts.
- Defense filed motions asserting selective prosecution, spoliation (suppression/mistrial), Brady violations (late spreadsheets), and vagueness of the indictment; the trial court declined to rule on some motions pretrial, denied others, granted limited continuances and expert funding, and ultimately denied the motion for new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Malouff) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Selective prosecution / motion to quash indictment | Malouff argued prosecution was selective/vindictive (others similarly situated not charged; motivated by his hostility to government) | State: prosecutorial discretion; co‑defendant charged; Malouff was alleged mastermind; no "exceptionally clear evidence" of invidious discrimination | Preserved point waived for failure to obtain adverse ruling on motion to quash; trial court did not abuse discretion in denying new trial on selective‑prosecution claim |
| Spoliation (destruction/disassembly of turbines) | Malouff: State permitted destruction of potentially exculpatory turbines and should have suppressed one‑sided testimony or granted mistrial/new trial | State: defense previously had notice and opportunity to preserve; no apparent exculpatory value before destruction; no bad faith by State; claim speculative; waiver/estoppel | Spoliation claim not preserved in several respects; on the merits court reasonably could find no Youngblood/Trombetta showing (apparent exculpatory value or bad faith); any error harmless given other evidence (conflict of interest, false application statements) |
| Brady / late production of analyst spreadsheets; trial continuances & expert funding | Malouff: late disclosure of spreadsheets was Brady material and prejudiced defense; sought continuances and expert assistance | State: spreadsheets were work product summarizing bank records already produced months earlier; any late production was remedied by court orders (production, limited continuances, expert funding); spreadsheets inculpatory as well | Court initially ruled spreadsheets Brady and ordered production; appellate posture: State argues ruling was error because spreadsheets were not favorable/material Brady evidence and were work product; defense’s continuance claims largely not preserved or show no prejudice |
| Motion to quash indictment for vagueness | Malouff: indictment insufficiently specific / vague about alleged deceptions and facts | State: indictment tracked statutory language for Securing Execution of a Document by Deception and added factual allegations; prior indictment and discovery provided ample notice | Indictment was sufficient; motion to quash denial proper; any alleged vagueness did not prejudice defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose favorable, material evidence to defense)
- California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (due process requires preservation only of evidence with apparent exculpatory value)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (no due process violation for loss of potentially useful evidence absent bad faith)
- United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (materiality standard for nondisclosure: reasonable probability of different outcome)
- Gawlik v. State, 608 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (defendant bears heavy burden to show selective prosecution)
- Colyer v. State, 428 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (standard of review for denial of motion for new trial: abuse of discretion)
- Ex parte Napper, 322 S.W.3d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (analysis of lost/destroyed evidence and limits on speculative claims)
- State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (indictment must give notice of specific transactions alleged; protects against trial by ambush)
- Little v. State, 991 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (prejudice standard for tardy Brady disclosures)