11 F.4th 462
6th Cir.2021Background
- The Trust owns ~16.15 acres in Mentor, Ohio adjacent to a road/interchange project that changed the area from rural to mixed-use and increased development potential.
- Property is zoned Single Family R-4 (low density). The Trust sought rezoning to Village Green RVG (3–5 units/acre with 15% open space) to build ~40 homes; under R-4 it could build ~13 homes given cul-de-sac limits.
- The Trust applied for rezoning in August 2019; the Planning Commission recommended denial and City Council denied the rezoning 4–3. A substantially similar RVG rezoning (Woodlands of Mentor) had been approved in 2017.
- The Trust sued the City alleging Takings Clause and Equal Protection violations (also pleaded substantive due process), seeking declaratory relief and damages. The City moved for judgment on the pleadings.
- The district court granted judgment on the pleadings, dismissing the Takings claim based on a discretionary-benefit/due-process property-interest theory and dismissing the class-of-one equal-protection claim for failure to plead facts negating possible rational bases. The Trust appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Trust has a cognizable property interest to pursue a Takings claim after the City denied rezoning | Ownership of the land is a sufficient property interest; the discretionary-benefit rule from due-process caselaw should not bar a takings claim; Lucas/Palazzolo background-principles analysis governs | Rezoning and related benefits are discretionary; under due-process caselaw a plaintiff cannot hold a property interest in a discretionary benefit, so takings claim fails | Reversed district court: discretionary-benefit rule from substantive due process cannot be imported wholesale into takings analysis; ownership can support a takings claim but whether a specific use was part of the owner’s title requires Lucas/Palazzolo analysis; remanded for further proceedings |
| Whether the Trust pleaded a viable class-of-one equal-protection claim based on the Woodlands of Mentor comparator | Trust alleged materially identical parcel size, unit counts, plats, and that the developments would not change neighborhood character, and therefore the City lacked any rational basis to approve Woodlands but deny Echo Hill | City contended the presumption of rationality applies; differences such as the two-year gap, location, and surrounding neighborhood could supply rational bases and plaintiff must negate likely non-discriminatory reasons | Reversed dismissal: at the pleading stage the Trust plausibly alleged similarly situated comparator and lack of a rational basis; because the City did not identify likely non-discriminatory reasons, the complaint survived judgment on the pleadings; remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005) (distinguishes physical takings from regulatory takings; warns against importing due-process analysis into takings inquiry)
- Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (total regulatory takings rule; background-principles exception to compensation)
- Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (multi-factor test for regulatory takings)
- Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (successive titleholders can challenge preexisting land-use restrictions; background-principles analysis not automatically applied)
- Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 141 S. Ct. 2063 (2021) (clarifies property-rights framing and takings for access/interference with rights)
- Engquist v. Oregon Dep't of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591 (2008) (limits class-of-one claims in public-employment discretionary contexts)
- EJS Properties, LLC v. City of Toledo, 698 F.3d 845 (6th Cir. 2012) (discusses class-of-one claims in zoning context)
- In re City of Detroit (Lyda v. City of Detroit), 841 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2016) (explains pleading burden to negate likely non-discriminatory rationales under rational-basis review)
- Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (ripeness principles for regulatory takings claims; administrative remedies/variance requirement)