Charles Alexander v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
71A03-1601-CR-78
| Ind. Ct. App. | Nov 10, 2016Background
- On Sept. 13, 2014, Charles Alexander entered Sean Diggins’s home, confronted Diggins and Paul Smith, demanded money, and held a revolver; a gunshot was heard and Alexander fled. Alexander was charged with attempted robbery (Level 3 felony).
- At trial, one juror was excused for sleeping; another juror was knitting; two jurors (Nos. 1 and 7) later said they recognized people in the gallery or the victim but denied any inability to be impartial. Defense counsel did not move to strike those jurors.
- Alexander testified and admitted a prior bank robbery guilty plea on direct examination. On cross-examination the State questioned the number of convictions and whether Alexander was on federal parole at the time of the charged offense.
- The trial court allowed the parole-related question for impeachment as bearing on bias/interest, limited further inquiry into convictions, and denied objections on relevance grounds.
- A jury convicted Alexander; he received a 16-year sentence and appealed, challenging (1) impeachment by questioning about parole and (2) the trial court’s failure to disqualify three jurors (sleeping juror was removed; knitting juror and two who recognized people were retained).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Alexander) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of parole-related impeachment | Cross-questioning was proper to show witness bias/interest and propensity to fabricate; relevant under Evid. R. 616 | Parole-status questioning was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial (Evid. R. 401, 403, 616, and 609) | Court: Admissible — parole status probative of bias; limited questioning; no unfair prejudice |
| Juror impartiality / failure to disqualify jurors | Trial court properly voir dired jurors who recognized people and knitting juror paid attention; counsel had chance to question and did not object | Retaining jurors who recognized the victim/gallery and a knitting juror created implied/actual bias and deprived Alexander of impartial jury (fundamental error) | Court: No fundamental error — voir dire showed jurors could be impartial; defense counsel invited/waived complaint |
Key Cases Cited
- Konopasek v. State, 946 N.E.2d 23 (Ind. 2011) (Evid. R. 401/616 relevance and impeachment principles)
- Dorsey v. State, 802 N.E.2d 991 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (bias/interest evidence admissible for impeachment)
- Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663 (Ind. 2014) (standard for fundamental error review)
- McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 1997) (trial court discretion in excusing jurors; weigh relationship vs. impartiality)
- Caruthers v. State, 926 N.E.2d 1016 (Ind. 2010) (implied bias requires a relationship between juror and a party)
- Joyner v. State, 736 N.E.2d 232 (Ind. 2000) (purpose of voir dire is to determine juror impartiality)
- Witte v. Mundy ex rel. Mundy, 820 N.E.2d 128 (Ind. 2005) (doctrine that a party may not claim error it invited)