899 F.3d 629
8th Cir.2018Background
- Richard Eggers, age 61 at hiring, worked in Wells Fargo’s Home Mortgage division; a 1963 Iowa fraud conviction (two days jail) did not appear on a name-based check in 2005 but surfaced on a 2010 FBI fingerprint rescreen.
- 12 U.S.C. § 1829(a)(1)(A) ("Section 19") bars employment at FDIC‑insured institutions by persons convicted of offenses involving dishonesty or breach of trust unless an FDIC waiver is obtained; employers or individuals may apply for waivers, and certain offenses are not waivable for ten years.
- Upon learning of the conviction, Wells Fargo offered leave so Richard could seek a waiver; he refused, and Wells Fargo terminated him to comply with Section 19; Richard later obtained an FDIC waiver but declined reinstatement and sued under the ADEA (Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
- Plaintiff (substituted by Richard’s widow after his death) alleged Wells Fargo’s policies—(1) refusing to sponsor Section 19 waiver applications and (2) failing to give pre‑screening notice of waiver availability—had a disparate impact on workers 40 and older.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Wells Fargo, finding plaintiff produced no legal authority or evidence supporting ADEA disparate‑impact or intentional discrimination claims; the Eighth Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wells Fargo’s refusal to sponsor waivers and failure to give pre‑screening notice caused a disparate impact on workers 40+ | Eggers: those policies created a disparate impact disadvantaging older workers | Wells Fargo: termination/rescreening was compelled by federal law (Section 19); plaintiff produced no statistical evidence of disparate impact | Held: Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie disparate‑impact case because she presented no statistical evidence showing causation; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether a statutorily mandated disqualification (Section 19) is distinguishable from employer policy such that plaintiff can proceed | Eggers: employer practices, not statutory mandate, produced disparate impact; claims should proceed | Wells Fargo: federal statute disqualified employee regardless of company policy; Section 19 controls employment eligibility | Held: Statutory disqualification is dispositive for qualification issue; even assuming not dispositive, lack of statistical proof ends claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 2011) (standard of review and summary judgment principles)
- Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (disparate‑impact prima facie requirements)
- Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (narrower scope of ADEA disparate‑impact liability)
- Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 554 U.S. 84 (2008) (RFOA affirmative‑defense framework)
- Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2001) (ADEA disparate‑impact burden shifting)
- Con‑Way Freight, Inc. v. EEOC, 622 F.3d 933 (8th Cir. 2010) (company disqualification policies and prima facie proof)
- Green v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (sweeping conviction‑based disqualification can violate anti‑discrimination laws)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment — burden to show essential elements)