Chardin v. Police Commissioner
465 Mass. 314
| Mass. | 2013Background
- Chardin challenged G. L. c. 140, § 131(d)(i), which bars licensure to carry firearms for those adjudicated a delinquent child for a felony.
- Chardin was adjudicated a delinquent child in 1995 at age 14 for possession of a firearm without a license and unlawful possession of ammunition.
- He later applied for an unrestricted Class A license to carry firearms in 2010; Boston denied the license due to the delinquent adjudication.
- Chardin sought judicial review arguing the statute violated the Second and Fourteenth Amendments as applied to him.
- The trial judge held Chardin statutorily disqualified; the single justice reserved and reported the constitutional question to the full court.
- The court held that § 131(d)(i) does not infringe the Second Amendment and is a presumptively lawful regulation for felons.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 131(d)(i) infringe the Second Amendment rights? | Chardin argues the statute burdens core Second Amendment conduct. | Commonwealth maintains it falls within presumptively lawful regulations. | No violation; statute passes constitutional muster. |
| Is adjudication as a delinquent child a disqualifying felony for licensure? | Delinquency adjudication should not automatically bar licensure since youth status mitigates culpability. | Legislature intended to bar licensure for delinquent felonies, including juvenile adjudications. | Yes, categorically disqualifies; consistent with long-standing regulation. |
| Does the decision trigger heightened scrutiny under Heller/McDonald framework? | As a restraint on fundamental right, it should undergo heightened scrutiny. | Regulation is presumptively lawful and not within core Second Amendment protections. | Regulation is presumptively lawful; not subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny here. |
| Do juvenile justice principles or Eighth Amendment limits affect the ruling? | Juvenile culpability and evolving standards could require different treatment. | Eighth Amendment does not apply to regulatory, non-punitive licensing framework. | Eighth Amendment does not bar the regulation; no repugnance with juvenile justice norms. |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (U.S. 2008) (recognizes an individual right to self-defense and presumptively lawful restrictions)
- McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (U.S. 2010) (Second Amendment fully applicable to states)
- Commonwealth v. McGowan, 464 Mass. 232 (Mass. 2013) (presumed-lawful regulatory measures outside Second Amendment scope)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (two-pronged approach: determine scope, then apply scrutiny if applicable)
- Fletcher v. Haas, 851 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 2012) (Massachusetts regulatory scheme challenged; distinguishes punishment from regulation)
- United States v. Rene E., 583 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2009) (juvenile statuses and firearms prohibitions aligned with longstanding prohibitions)