Chapman v. Mayfield, 358 Or. 196

Background

Plaintiffs were shot by Mayfield after he left the Eagles Lodge; plaintiffs sued the Lodge for negligent overservice of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated patron.
Mayfield, a 67‑year‑old with no known violent history and carrying a concealed handgun unknown to staff, drank at the Lodge and later fired into the Gresham Players Club, injuring plaintiffs; breath tests showed high BAC (~0.18–0.25%).
Plaintiffs alleged negligent serving to a visibly intoxicated person caused the off‑premises, unintended shooting and relied on (a) an expert affidavit (Dr. Brady) opining that intoxicated drinkers frequently become violent and (b) a bartender’s testimony that alcohol causes violence in his bar.
The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant, finding plaintiffs’ evidence insufficient to prove the type of harm was reasonably foreseeable; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
The Supreme Court reviewed whether (1) proof of service to a visibly intoxicated person alone creates a triable issue of foreseeability, and (2) plaintiffs’ combined evidence sufficed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.
The Court held that overservice alone is insufficient and that plaintiffs’ evidence described the risk too generally and failed to show defendant knew or should have known of an unreasonable risk that would produce the injuries suffered.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether serving alcohol to a visibly intoxicated patron, by itself, creates a jury question on foreseeability of later violent acts	Service to a visibly intoxicated person should suffice to create foreseeability (relying on Campbell and public knowledge of alcohol‑related risks)	Overservice alone cannot establish foreseeability of random violent crime; need particularized facts showing risk	Held: Overservice alone is not enough to establish foreseeability of subsequent violent criminal acts
What level/kind of evidence is required to show defendant knew or should have known of an unreasonable risk of the type of harm	General expert testimony and bartender experience about link between intoxication and violence suffice when viewed together	Such generalizations are too conclusory and speculative; need evidence tying risk to the particular patron or showing rate/types of violence	Held: Plaintiffs’ expert and bartender evidence was too general; plaintiffs failed to present specific, relevant evidence to create a triable issue
Proper characterization of the “type of harm” for foreseeability analysis	Plaintiffs: foreseeability need not be exact mechanism; general risk of violent harm suffices	Defendant: must describe particular type/class of harm and plaintiffs—random off‑premises shootings are highly unusual	Held: The appropriate description was an unintentional attack by a visibly intoxicated patron off premises; plaintiffs described the risk too generally
Role of courts vs. juries on foreseeability at summary judgment	Plaintiffs: courts should allow juries to weigh common knowledge and combined evidence	Defendant: courts must screen conclusory proofs; foreseeability is a legal limit and may be decided as matter of law when evidence is thin	Held: Court may grant summary judgment where evidence fails to show a reasonable prospect that defendant knew or should have known of the specific unreasonable risk

Key Cases Cited

Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or 603 (foreseeability analysis and describing harm at an appropriate level of generality)
Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or 1 (focus on particular facts and class of plaintiffs when assessing foreseeability)
Buchler v. Oregon Corrections Div., 316 Or 499 (limits on foreseeability for third‑party criminal acts; disavowing overly broad "facilitation" rationale)
Moore v. Willis, 307 Or 254 (overservice alone insufficient at pleading stage to show foreseeability of off‑premises violent harm)
Hawkins v. Conklin, 307 Or 262 (similar holding; need facts showing tavern knew or should have known of risk)
Campbell v. Carpenter, 279 Or 237 (holding foreseeability as matter of law for drunk driving when patron visibly intoxicated)
Chartrand v. Coos Bay Tavern, 298 Or 689 (judicial notice cannot replace proof that defendant knew or should have known patron would drive)