Chandler v. McFadden
1:16-cv-02994
D.S.C.Jun 5, 2017Background
- Petitioner Terrell Chandler was convicted by a jury in South Carolina (murder and weapon charge) and sentenced to consecutive 45 and 5 year terms. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal; PCR relief was denied and certiorari was denied by the state supreme court.
- Chandler filed a pro se 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition raising claims including involuntary confession, ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, false testimony by a co-defendant, and insufficiency of the evidence.
- Respondent moved for summary judgment; the magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment and dismissing the petition with prejudice. The district court initially adopted the R&R, then vacated that adoption to consider timely objections and ultimately adopted the R&R.
- The magistrate judge and district court found (1) some claims procedurally defaulted (failure to exhaust), (2) Martinez did not excuse defaults relating to appellate counsel errors on direct appeal, and (3) the trial court’s determination that Chandler’s second and third statements were voluntary was reasonable under the totality of circumstances.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, dismissed the § 2254 petition with prejudice, and denied a certificate of appealability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Were certain ineffective-assistance claims procedurally defaulted and, if so, is there cause to excuse the default? | Chandler: grounds 2 and 4 (labeled 5 in objections) were not properly raised in state court but cause exists to excuse default (including invoking Martinez for appellate counsel failure). | Respondent: claims were not raised in state court and are procedurally defaulted; Martinez does not apply to appellate counsel errors on direct appeal. | Court: Ground 2 and ground 4 are procedurally defaulted; Chandler failed to show cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice; Martinez does not apply to direct-appeal attorney errors. |
| Were Chandler's second and third statements to police involuntary such that suppression was required? | Chandler: statements coerced by detective’s threat that he would be charged with murder unless he made a statement; small, hot room; intimidation by Detective Fleming. | Respondent: Miranda warnings were given; Chandler made earlier voluntary statements; recorded/written statements exist; trial court findings credible. | Court: Under totality of circumstances, statements were voluntary; state court’s factual finding was reasonable and not contrary to federal law. |
| Did trial counsel render ineffective assistance by failing to request a special co-defendant credibility instruction? | Chandler: counsel should have requested a jury instruction that accomplice/co-defendant testimony be weighed with greater care. | Respondent: No constitutional requirement for a special co-defendant instruction; trial jury instructions on credibility were adequate. | Court: Failure to request such instruction did not demonstrate constitutionally deficient performance or prejudice; claim procedurally defaulted. |
| Is a certificate of appealability appropriate? | Chandler: (implicitly) issues warrant appeal. | Respondent: Chandler failed to make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. | Court: COA denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (ineffective assistance during initial-review collateral proceedings can establish cause to excuse procedural default for ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (standard for unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under § 2254)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (cause-and-prejudice test and procedural default doctrine)
- Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (hearing requirement and standards for voluntariness of confessions)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (failure to give Miranda warnings renders statements inadmissible unless waived)
- Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985) (voluntariness is a legal question requiring independent federal determination)
- Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952) (jury should weigh credibility and weight of testimony rather than rigid exclusion rules)
- United States v. Byers, 649 F.3d 197 (4th Cir.) (2011) (totality-of-circumstances test for voluntariness of confession)
- United States v. Braxton, 112 F.3d 777 (4th Cir.) (1997) (coercion must be sufficient to overbear will to invalidate confession)
