Chandler v. Geico Indemnity Co.
78 So. 3d 1293
| Fla. | 2011Background
- Shazier, an insured under Geico, rented a car from Avis and designated Geico as primary insurer.
- Avis’s rental agreement prohibited driving by anyone not expressly authorized, and stated unauthorized use voids liability protection.
- Shazier allowed Royal, who then allowed Jordan to drive; Jordan caused a serious injury and a death.
- Geico sought a declaratory judgment that it had no duty to defend or indemnify Shazier or Jordan; district court granted summary judgment for Geico, sua sponte treating the rental car as a non-owned auto, not a temporary substitute auto.
- First District reversed, holding the rental car was not a temporary substitute auto because Avis did not expressly permit Jordan to drive, thus no coverage under Geico’s policy.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is there a conflict over consent/permission meaning under dangerous instrumentality doctrine? | Shazier (plaintiff) argues Susco/Roth define consent broadly and cannot be vitiated by third-party restrictions. | Geico (defendant) argues the rental contract’s permission limits apply, so Jordan was not permitted and no coverage. | Yes; conflict exists between Shazier and Susco/Roth on consent scope. |
| Does the Geico policy treat a temporary substitute auto as owned auto when owner consent is present? | Geico coverage should attach because Avis granted permission to Shazier to use the rental car as a substitute for the owned auto. | Consent is limited to the operator, so no permission to Jordan means no temporary substitute auto. | Interpretation favors coverage; rental became a temporary substitute auto with permission. |
| Did the district court misapply Duncan Auto Realty’s scope-of-use concept to restrict consent? | Duncan’s scope-of-use principle should not override consent for use under Susco/Roth. | Duncan correctly limits permissible use to the purpose, not the operator, thus revoking permission when outside scope. | Duncan misapplied; consent is broader under Susco/Roth; conflicts with district ruling. |
Key Cases Cited
- Susco Car Rental Sys. of Fla. v. Leonard, 112 So.2d 832 (Fla.1959) (consent for use not limited by unauthorized-operator clauses under dangerous instrumentality doctrine)
- Roth v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 269 So.2d 3 (Fla.1972) (consent for use remains broader; third-party restrictions do not defeat liability)
- American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Blanton, 182 So.2d 36 (Fla.1st DCA 1966) (use vs. operation; permissive use extends coverage despite restrictions)
- Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 103 So.2d 243 (Fla.3d DCA 1958) (consent to use cannot be negated by private restrictions in rental contracts)
- Duncan Auto Realty, Ltd. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 754 So.2d 863 (Fla.3d DCA 2000) (owner defines scope of permissible use; test drives; distinguish scope from operator identity)
- State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Clauson, 511 So.2d 1085 (Fla.3d DCA 1987) (bailee/lessee liability under dangerous instrumentality when third-party operators)