Chambers v. The Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 259 N.C. App. 8

On Aug. 23, 2011 Christopher Chambers, an uninsured emergency patient, signed Moses Cone’s Patient Consent form which obligated him to pay the hospital’s “regular rates and terms.”
Moses Cone billed Chambers roughly $14,578 and sued in district court when unpaid; Chambers filed a putative class action in superior court alleging uninsured ER patients were billed chargemaster (gross) rates and seeking, among other theories, a declaratory judgment that the consent form limited recovery to the "reasonable value" of services.
Chambers’ original complaint alleged multiple claims; his April 1, 2016 amended complaint narrowed to a single claim for declaratory relief about the meaning of "regular rates and terms."
After the amendment, Moses Cone dismissed with prejudice its counterclaims and the district-court claim against Chambers, effectively writing off Chambers’ bill.
The trial court dismissed Chambers’ amended class complaint as moot on March 16, 2017; Chambers appealed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether dismissal of Moses Cone’s counterclaims and write-off of Chambers’ bill moots the class action	Chambers argued exceptions to mootness apply and the class action should continue despite dismissal of his individual claim	Moses Cone argued dismissal of its counterclaims removed Chambers’ personal stake, rendering the proposed class action moot because the sole representative no longer has standing	The court held the action was dismissible: Chambers’ individual claim was extinguished and he no longer had a genuine personal interest as sole class representative, so dismissal was affirmed
Whether mootness exceptions (termination-of-representative, voluntary cessation, public-interest) preserve the class claim	Chambers relied on (1) termination-of-representative exception, (2) voluntary cessation, (3) public-interest exception	Moses Cone asserted none of those exceptions applied given the facts and that Chambers lacked individual standing post-dismissal	Court rejected the exceptions: the termination-of-representative exception did not apply because Chambers’ alleged harm was not temporary; and because the sole representative lacked a personal stake, the class could not proceed under Rule 23

Faulkenbury v. Teachers' & State Emps' Ret. Sys. of N.C., 345 N.C. 683, 483 S.E.2d 422 (1997) (Rule 23 requires named representatives to have a genuine personal interest and adequately represent the class)
Crow v. Citicorp Acceptance Co., 319 N.C. 274, 354 S.E.2d 459 (1987) (party bringing class action bears burden to show Rule 23 prerequisites)
Meadows v. Iredell Cty., 187 N.C. App. 785, 653 S.E.2d 925 (2007) (one who is not a member of the class may not represent it; standing requirements analogous to Rule 23)
Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 451 S.E.2d 858 (1994) (narrow class of cases where termination of representative’s claim does not moot unnamed members’ claims)
Thomas v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., 124 N.C. App. 698, 478 S.E.2d 816 (1996) (mootness doctrine and exceptions such as voluntary cessation and public-interest considerations)
City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (defendant’s voluntary cessation does not necessarily moot a case)
N.C. Baptist Hosps. v. Harris, 319 N.C. 347, 354 S.E.2d 471 (1987) (doctrine of necessaries and spousal liability for medical expenses)